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ABSTRACT
The first section of the paper reviews patterns in modern federal antitrust enforcement.  
Some commentators have theorized that modern enforcement has swung back and forth between 
extremes in response to changes in political leadership in the federal antitrust agencies and that 
there is little continuity of viewpoints between the extremes of the arc.  Using enforcement data 
from 1961 through 2004, the paper reveals that the assumptions underlying these theories are 
faulty.  In reality, there was a seismic shift in antitrust theory in the 1960s and early 1970s that 
courts began to adopt in the mid 1970s.  The paper demonstrates that while antitrust agencies 
lagged in adjusting to these developments, they eventually changed in the 1980s to a new course 
on which they have basically remained, with relatively minor adjustments.  The enforcement that 
followed built upon the contributions of earlier periods; the cumulative effect was a bipartisan 
and widely shared vision of appropriate policy.
The second section of the paper derives lessons about policymaking from antitrust 
enforcement experience in recent decades.  Developments in economic learning and changes in 
industrial conditions or technology are important guideposts to ensure that competition policy 
does not veer off into ineffective or harmful backwaters.  Despite evolving economic scholarship 
that undermined the theoretical support for certain types of cases, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in the 1970s continued on a misguided course regarding dominant firm misconduct, 
vertical distribution restraints, and the treatment of merger efficiencies.  In addition to these 
weaknesses in enforcement theories, the second section of the paper also identifies 
administrative errors by the FTC during this period.  The agency took on many more complex 
cases than it could execute well, even if those cases had not also had doctrinal difficulties.
The paper concludes by suggesting practical approaches that government agencies, and, 
more specifically, the FTC should take to improve the quality of competition policy.  It argues 
that agencies need to reassess their status continually by analyzing the effects of previous actions 
and making adjustments, if necessary, and by keeping abreast of developments in theory and 
evidence. Agencies must also engage in what can be called “competition policy research and 
development” to increase their intellectual capital and inform the competition policy community 
about important developments.  Finally, they must evaluate the potential long-term institutional 
impact of their actions and ensure that they are not diminishing their future capabilities.
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Introduction
Antitrust has a wide interdisciplinary attraction.  While the connection to economics is 
obvious, antitrust also has appeal to other areas of study.  For example, antitrust decisions often 
resemble historical narratives.  In technical terms, Standard Oil2 and Socony-Vacuum3 discuss 
the rule of reason and per se illegality, yet they also tell the history of the petroleum industry.  
These legal landmarks offer perspectives upon our nation’s economy and regulatory institutions, 
both past and present.
Antitrust history extends beyond the development of individual commercial sectors and 
regulatory institutions. The history of federal competition policy can inform future government 
enforcement practice in at least two key respects.4   The first is to provide an accurate view of 
1 Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.  The views here are mine, not those of any 
other Commissioner.  I would like to thank William E. Kovacic and Maureen K. Ohlhausen for 
their help in preparing this paper.  I would also like to thank Thomas Krattenmaker for his 
helpful comments.
2 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
3 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
4 Applications of historical research to modern enforcement policy form the core of 
three recent papers by FTC officials.  In 2002, Commissioner Thomas Leary evaluated the 
development of federal merger enforcement policy and the treatment of efficiency arguments in 
merger analysis.  Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002); Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, 
3how the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have exercised 
their authority.  An accurate positive understanding of yesterday’s enforcement trends helps 
formulate normative proposals about how the agencies should act tomorrow.  The second, 
closely-related contribution of historical analysis involves the evaluation and interpretation of 
past experience.  Beyond knowing what the enforcement agencies did, it is important to 
understand why they made specific policy choices and why those initiatives succeeded or failed. 
This paper reviews modern federal enforcement policy for its lessons about how present 
and future competition agencies should exercise their authority.  In doing so, it will synthesize 
insights from the existing literature, add additional analysis of history, and discuss noteworthy 
implications of modern U.S. experience for making competition policy in the years ahead.  This 
paper has three specific aims.  The first is to describe how federal enforcement activity has 
evolved since 1961.  In documenting adjustments in the mix of enforcement outputs, it will 
emphasize the “essential stability” of U.S. competition policy since 1981.  The second goal is to 
assess why enforcement patterns evolved as they have – to go beyond a simple recital of 
enforcement activity to identify strengths and weaknesses in agency decision making.  The third 
objective is to suggest how modern experience can inform future practice in making competition 
policy.  A careful assessment of the past provides a richer understanding of how government 
agencies should act. 
To accomplish these goals, the first section of this paper reviews patterns in modern 
Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution, Remarks Before the ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law 2002 Fall Forum (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/efficienciesandantitrust.htm>.  In 2003, FTC General 
Counsel, William Kovacic, completed a study of how DOJ and FTC antitrust enforcement norms 
have evolved since 1960.  William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition 
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003).
4federal antitrust enforcement.  Some commentators have theorized that modern federal antitrust 
enforcement has swung back and forth between extremes in response to changes in political 
leadership in the federal antitrust agencies.  These theories hold that shifts in leadership cause 
sharp swings in the opposite enforcement direction and that there is little continuity of 
viewpoints between the extremes of the arc.  Using enforcement data from 1961 through 2004, 
the paper reveals that the assumptions underlying these theories are faulty.  In reality, there was a 
seismic shift in antitrust theory in the 1960s and early 1970s that courts began to adopt in the mid 
1970s.  The paper demonstrates that while antitrust agencies lagged in adjusting to these 
developments, they eventually changed in the 1980s to a new course on which they have 
basically remained, with relatively minor adjustments.  The enforcement that followed built upon 
the contributions of earlier periods and the cumulative effect was a bipartisan and widely shared 
vision of appropriate policy.
The second section of the paper derives lessons about policymaking from antitrust 
enforcement experience in recent decades.  Developments in economic learning and changes in 
industrial conditions or technology are important guideposts to ensure that competition policy 
does not veer off into ineffective or harmful backwaters.  The paper examines enforcement 
initiatives based on dominant firm misconduct, which sought structural remedies to reduce the 
market shares of dominant firms in a number of industries.  Despite evolving economic 
scholarship that undermined the theoretical support for this theory, the FTC in the 1970s 
continued this agenda.  The paper charts the FTC’s similar misguided course in the areas of 
vertical distribution restraints and merger efficiencies.  In addition to these weaknesses in 
enforcement theories, the second section of the paper also identifies administrative errors by the 
FTC during this period.  The agency took on many more complex cases than it could execute 
5well, even if those cases had not also had doctrinal difficulties.       
The third part of the paper suggests practical approaches that government agencies, and, 
more specifically, the FTC should take to improve the quality of competition policy.  It argues 
that agencies need to reassess their status continually by analyzing the effects of previous actions 
and making adjustments, if necessary, and by keeping abreast of developments in theory and 
evidence.  Agencies must also engage in what can be called “competition policy research and 
development” to increase their intellectual capital and inform the competition policy community 
about important developments.  Finally, they must evaluate the potential long-term institutional
impact of their actions and ensure that they are not diminishing their future capabilities.
I. The Evolution of Federal Antitrust Enforcement: 1961 through 2004
A. The Pendulum Narrative
A change in administration and the appointment of new leaders to the federal 
enforcement agencies routinely inspire discussion about the future of antitrust policy and the 
start of a Republican majority at the FTC in June 2001 was no exception.  Despite statements 
that competition initiatives at the Commission under a new chairman would feature substantial 
continuity with the program of the previous Democratic chairman of the FTC, Robert Pitofsky,5
antitrust commentors reacted either with disbelief that antitrust enforcement would continue6 or 
5 Timothy J. Muris, Robert Pitofsky: Public Servant and Scholar, 52 CASE W. RES. 
L. Rev. 25 (2001); Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word – Continuity, Remarks Before the 
American Bar Association Antitrust Section Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 7, 2001), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm >.
6
 “You’ve probably never heard of Charles James or Tim Muris.   Maybe not even 
Michael Powell. . . .  Together they herald a radical shift in the enforcement of America’s 
antitrust laws: Under the Bush administration, there may not be any.” John B. Judis, Trust Walk, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, June 11, 2001 (emphasis added), available at
6with concern that there would be no change.7  Both perspectives are intriguing.  Why did some 
commentators pose the prospect that the FTC would cease antitrust enforcement or “abandon the 
field”?  Why did others react with dismay about continuing the competition program of the 
Clinton Administration?
Each expression of alarm reflects, in its own way, uncritical acceptance of what observers 
have called the pendulum narrative of modern federal antitrust enforcement.  The pendulum 
narrative classifies the last 40 years of DOJ and FTC enforcement in three phases: Too active in 
the 1960s and 1970s, too passive in the 1980s, and properly moderate in the 1990s.  Put in terms 
that Goldilocks made famous, antitrust enforcement goes from too hot, to too cold, to just right.
Embedded in the pendulum narrative are three assumptions that explain the reactions to a 
prediction of continuity.  One is that change in the ideology of leadership in the federal agencies 
mainly drives swings from one period to another.  This view makes competition policy
extremely sensitive to presidential appointments.  The second assumption is that the Reagan 
administration laid waste to antitrust enforcement.8  This view predicts that anyone with a hand 
in the Reagan program would be inclined to extinguish antitrust enforcement.  The third 
<http://www.thenewrepublic.com/061101/judis060001.htm>.  See also Albert A. Foer, Antitrust 
in Peril, RUTLAND HERALD DAILY, June 20, 2001 (“State attorneys general are prepared to 
expand the consumer watchdog if the FTC and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division 
abandon the field.”) (emphasis added), available at
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/128.cfm>.
7 George Bittlingmayer, The Antitrust Emperor’s Clothes, 25 REGULATION 46 (Fall 
2002) (“Little has changed,” this commentator noted.  “The antitrust experts may be having fun, 
but the clothes they have draped on the emperor are threadbare at best.”)
8 Commentators who accept the basic premises of the pendulum narrative vary in 
their views about the degree and effects of the retrenchment in the 1980s.  For example, 
Professor Bittlingmayer applauds the Reagan administration’s efforts to redefine the zone of 
enforcement, but he concludes that the Reagan antitrust agencies did not press the realignment 
aggressively enough.  See id. at 48.
7assumption is that enforcement policy in the 1990s displayed little connection to enforcement 
policy in the 1980s, with the federal agencies’ programs in the 1990s significantly departing 
from 1980s practice.
These assumptions explain the responses to the continuity prediction.  If one believes that 
U.S. competition policy is prone to dramatic swings in activity, and that Reagan-era policy was 
an aberrational, inexcusably permissive departure from sensible enforcement, it follows that the 
appointment by a Republican president of an FTC chairman who helped shape Reagan-era 
policies might foreshadow the end of the Commission’s antitrust activity.9  If one believes that 
enforcement policy takes shape in watertight compartments defined by each administration 
without significant links to or contributions from its predecessors, then the Clinton FTC retained 
little of the policies of the Reagan and first Bush administrations.  In this framework, it is 
reasonable to believe that no one who conceived or endorsed the Reagan antitrust program could 
embrace so much of the Clinton antitrust agenda.
Each of these assumptions is faulty.  Because the Goldilocks story depends on all of 
them, it is bankrupt for interpreting the development of modern competition policy.  The balance 
of this section shows that modern experience does not feature dramatic, mechanistic swings in 
antitrust enforcement across periods from 1961 through 2000.  Instead, there has been a 
paradigm shift in antitrust.  The key phase of the transformation, led mainly by the academy and 
the courts, took place with the absorption of Chicago School perspectives into the mainstream of 
antitrust policy in the 1970s and 1980s.10  Although the government agencies were the last to get 
9 The author was Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition from 1983 to 1985.
10 See Terry Calvani & Michael L. Sibarium, Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline, 
35 ANTITRUST BULL. 123, 174 (1990) (concluding that modern antitrust law’s “most significant 
8the message, even the agencies took some steps before the 1980s to begin developing many of 
the sensible policies of today.  There was a dramatic departure in 1981 from much of previous 
government policy, but enforcement across eras displays significant degrees of cumulative 
development.  Closer to the present, enforcement in the 1990s reveals considerable similarity to 
norms endorsed in the 1980s.  Indeed, this similarity caused Ralph Nader to observe during the 
2000 presidential campaign that “[b]oth parties are terrible on antitrust.”11  The elements of 
continuity and the institutional forces that account for the continuity explain why the U.S. 
competition policy system has escaped the mistakes of its past as well as built on prior successes.
B. Federal Enforcement Activity Reconsidered: 1961-2003
A common approach to evaluating federal competition policymaking is to examine the 
filing of new cases.   This section examines enforcement trends over the past four decades.  As a 
preliminary matter, one must recognize that the commencement of enforcement matters provides 
a rough, but highly imperfect, impression of agency activity.  Even if one assumes that case 
filings are a suitable proxy for the quality of enforcement, many difficult methodological issues 
confront the identification and classification of cases.  For example, many complaints or 
changes have been in the case law, influenced by work done in the academy in the fields of law 
and industrial organization economics, much of which predates the Reagan era”); William E. 
Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43, 52-53 (2000) (discussing influence of Chicago School perspectives on 
antitrust jurisprudence in 1970s). 
11 Ralph Nader, CNN Burden of Proof, Aug. 9, 2000, Transcript No. 00080900V12, 
at 6.  Nader continued: 
Look, we have Boeing now, one aircraft company, manufacturer after the 
McDonnell Douglas merger.  They've allowed mergers under Clinton of the giant 
HMOs, the giant hospital chains, the giant telecommunication companies.  Their 
one bright light is . . . Microsoft.
Id. 
9settlements represent the culmination in one administration of activity (such as the initiation or 
pursuit of an investigation) that began in previous administrations.  Moreover, raw case counts 
also say little about the doctrinal or economic significance of specific matters, or their actual 
market impact.12
This is not to say that case counts lack value.  Indeed, as we will see, an accurate 
portrayal of past case activity can reveal significant shifts in policy.  The discussion below 
examines trends in enforcement concerning both nonmerger and merger matters.  The data focus 
on FTC enforcement, with considerable discussion of DOJ activity. 
1. Federal Nonmerger Antitrust Enforcement: 1961-2000
Table 1 provides an aggregate overview of FTC nonmerger enforcement activity by 
presidential administration from 1961 through 2000:
Table 1: Average Number of FTC Antitrust Nonmerger Cases Per Calendar Year – 1961 
through 200313
12 Moreover, a case-centric approach does not count the publication of influential 
FTC studies, the preparation of reports that present the results of workshops or hearings 
concerning significant competition policy issues, or advocacy that discourages a legislature or 
regulatory authority from needlessly restricting competition.  See, e.g., Federal Trade 
Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf>; Federal Trade Commission, 
To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (Oct. 
2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf>; Federal Trade 
Commission, Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (Sept. 2003), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf>; Federal Trade Commission 
Staff Report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global 
Marketplace (May 1996), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf>; 
Federal Trade Commission, A Positive Agenda for Consumers: The FTC Year in Review 21-22 
(Apr. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Year in Review] (describing FTC advocacy filings involving the 
unauthorized practice of law and proposals to restrict the sale of replacement contact lenses).
13 Table 1 is derived from data collected from the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.  
The averages are rounded to the nearest tenth of a case.  “HR” means horizontal restraints, “VR” 
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President HR VR Dominance RP
Kennedy/Johnson (1961-68) 2.6 2.4 1 64.7
Nixon/Ford (1968-1976) 1.5 7.4 1.2 5.1
Carter (1977-1980) 5.5 5.8 0.7 2
Reagan (1981-1988) 7 0.6 0.2 0.6
Bush I (1989-1992) 6.2 1 0 0
Clinton (1993-2000) 7.6 1 0.5 0.1
Bush II (2001-2003) 9.6 0 1.3 0
Tables 2 and 3 provide a point of comparison for FTC activity and a fuller perspective on 
government enforcement by adding data for DOJ for matters involving monopolization or 
attempted monopolization and vertical contractual restraints, respectively.  Table 4 provides data 
by decade on DOJ criminal cases.
Table 2: Average Number of DOJ and FTC Monopolization and Attempted 
Monopolization Cases Per Calendar Year – 1961 to 200314
President DOJ FTC Total Federal Average
Kennedy/Johnson (1961-1968) 1.6 1 2.6
Nixon/Ford (1969-1976) 2.1 1.2 3.3
Carter (1977-1980) 0.5 0.7 1.2
Reagan (1981-1988) 0.2 0.2 0.4
Bush I (1989-1992) 0 0 0
Clinton (1993-2000) 0.9 0.5 1.4
Bush II (2001-2003) 0 1.3 1.3
Table 3: Average Number of DOJ and FTC Vertical Restraints Cases Per Calendar Year –
1961 through 200315
means vertical restraints, and “RP” stands for Robinson Patman.
14 Table 2 is derived from data collected from the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.  
The averages are rounded to the nearest tenth of a case.
15 Table 3 is derived from data collected from the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.  
The averages are rounded to the nearest tenth of a case.
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President DOJ FTC Total Federal Cases/Year
Kennedy/Johnson (1961-1968) 4 2.4 6.4
Nixon/Ford (1969-1976) 6.5 7.4 13.9
Carter (1977-1980) 1.2 5.8 7
Reagan (1981-88) 0 0.6 0.6
Bush I (1989-1992) 0 1 1
Clinton (1993-2000) 1 1 2
Bush II (2001-2003) 0 0 0
Table 4: DOJ Criminal Antitrust Cases Average Per Calendar Year – 1961 to 200216
Decade Average Number of Cases/Year
1961 to 1970 12.8
1971 to 1980 8.1
1981 to 1990 80.2
1991 to 2000 62.2
2001 to 200317 39.3
The enforcement data from 1961 through 2003 present a more complex mosaic of 
enforcement activity than the pendulum narrative suggests.  Rather than featuring a single pattern 
consisting of dramatic swings from one level of enforcement to another, the data show four 
different patterns.  First, as Table 1 reveals, Robinson-Patman enforcement declines in each 
decade after the 1960s.  By the 1970s, the DOJ ceded all RP enforcement to the FTC,18 which 
16 Table 4 is derived from workload statistics provided by the Antitrust Division.
17 The decline in average number of cases in 2001 to 2003 is likely the result of a 
precipitous decline in grand jury investigations initiated in the mid to late 1990s.  Initiations of 
grand jury investigations in the years 1991-1993 averaged 49 per year; in the remaining years of 
the 1990s, the average was 27 per year; which includes 1999 when DOJ initiated only 19 such 
investigations.  Because a grand jury investigation is a prerequisite to a criminal indictment, the 
decline in such investigations in the mid to late 1990s necessarily led to a decline in the 
subsequent initiations of criminal antitrust cases in 2001 and 2002.  DOJ, however, has recently 
reversed this trend and, in 2003, initiated 48 grand jury investigations.
18 See Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law 
Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 99 (1990) (during Kauper’s tenure as head of 
the Antitrust Division in the 1970s, DOJ “used its understanding with the FTC that the latter 
would be responsible for government enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act to avoid any 
12
pursued numerous matters throughout that decade.  Following harsh criticism by the 1969 
American Bar Association study of the FTC’s RP program19 and the appointment in 1970 of the 
study’s chair (Miles Kirkpatrick) to head the agency, the Commission de-emphasized RP 
enforcement.  This programmatic adjustment, which dropped the number of RP matters to an 
average of two per year by the end of the 1970s, produced a lasting change.
Second, Tables 1 and 4 reveal that horizontal restraints enforcement, including DOJ 
prosecution of criminal cases, expanded.  With some variation in the number of prosecutions 
after 1980, horizontal cases became the centerpiece of nonmerger federal government 
enforcement.  New and enduring focal points of civil enforcement activity included the 
professions and their trade associations.20  Beginning in the mid- to late-1970s, DOJ gave 
primacy to the criminal prosecution of supplier collusion and expanded this effort from the early 
1980s onward.  Although criminal prosecutions decreased somewhat in number in the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s, DOJ achieved a dramatic increase in penalties recovered.21
Third, vertical distribution restraints cases (see Table 3) were a prominent part of 
involvement under a statute it thought economically unwise”).
19 Commission to Study the FTC, American Bar Association, Report of the 
Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission 67-68 (Sept. 15, 1969) (recommending that 
FTC “initiate a study and appraisal of the compatibility of the Robinson-Patman Act and its 
current interpretations to the attainment of antitrust objectives” and, during this appraisal, limit 
the agency’s enforcement of the Act to “instances in which injury to competition is clear”).
20 Pivotal developments in this progression included cases initiated in the 1970s by 
the DOJ and the FTC, respectively, against the National Society of Professional Engineers and 
the American Medical Association.  See National Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679 (1978); American Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d per 
curiam by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
21 See Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for 
Reporting Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798 (2001) (reviewing increase in DOJ antitrust 
criminal enforcement recoveries in 1990s).
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government enforcement through the 1970s, especially at the FTC.  During the Reagan 
administration, vertical restraints activity ceased, save for the entry by the FTC of a small 
number of consent orders in matters for which investigations largely had been completed during 
the Carter administration.  From 1989 through 1992, the DOJ brought no vertical restraints 
matters, while the FTC initiated one case per year.  During the Clinton administration, the DOJ 
and the FTC each issued an average of one vertical restraints case per year.  
The rate of vertical restraints activity during the Clinton administration exceeded 
enforcement levels during the Reagan administration and the Bush I program at the DOJ.  
Nonetheless, the average number of total DOJ and FTC cases per year (two) from 1993 through 
2000 paled in comparison to levels of enforcement that prevailed before 1981.   Total federal 
vertical restraints cases averaged roughly 6.4 per year in the Kennedy/Johnson era, nearly 14 per 
year in the Nixon/Ford administrations, and 7 per year during the Carter presidency.  As will be 
discussed below,22 the failure of the government agencies before 1981 to absorb the new 
economic learning toward these cases, even after the Supreme Court in Sylvania in 1977 had 
repudiated Schwinn’s per se ban on non-price restraints, stands out as one of the most significant 
(and avoidable) institutional failings of federal enforcement of that period.
Finally, the data in Table 2 indicate that enforcement involving dominant firm 
misconduct peaked in the Nixon/Ford years.  As discussed below,23 these matters had serious 
implications for federal enforcement, and U.S. competition policy, that mere case counts do not 
adequately portray.  The number of DOJ and FTC dominant firm matters declined in the 1980s.  
Dominant firm prosecutions increased in the Clinton years, but to levels well below those 
22 See infra Section II.A.2.
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prevailing before 1981.  Section 2 cases have continued in the Bush II era, at least at the FTC.
As the foregoing observations suggest, the pendulum narrative is flawed even when one 
focuses on simple case counts.  In the nonmerger area, the Clinton years continued the ascent of 
horizontal restraints that began in the mid-1970s and accelerated under Bill Baxter and Jim 
Miller in the 1980s.24  At the FTC, the decline in RP enforcement began in the 1970s and 
continued through the subsequent decades.  No one is likely to interpret the FTC’s decision to 
accept a consent agreement in 2000 in the McCormick spice case,25 a much debated matter 
concluded with a 3-2 vote, as presaging a new era of expansive RP enforcement.    
Vertical distribution cases did change in the enforcement mix from 1981 to 2000 – from 
barely existent (the settlement of a few matters in the 1980s), to one case per year at the FTC 
during Bush I, and an average of one case per year at both the DOJ and the FTC in the Clinton 
administration.26  In light of the demanding requirements that Sylvania, Monsanto,27 Sharp,28 and 
23 See infra Section II.A.1.
24 See Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 4, at 415 (discussing increasing 
prominence given to horizontal restraints enforcement by DOJ and FTC from 1970s through 
1990s).
25 McCormick & Co., [FTC Complaints & Orders 1997-2001 Transfer Binder] 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,711 (2000).
26 During the Bush II administration, neither the DOJ nor the FTC have issued a 
vertical restraints case.  Vertical issues, more generally, have been the subject of non-vertical 
restraints cases, including FTC challenges to vertical mergers and to dominant firm exclusionary 
conduct having vertical dimensions.  See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 2003 Year in Review, 
at 8 (discussing FTC’s analysis of vertical issues in deciding to challenge Cytyc/Digene merger). 
27 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
28 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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Khan29 have imposed on plaintiffs seeking to sustain distribution practices claims, vertical cases 
are bound to have only a diminished place in any future enforcement program.30  Moreover, 
many scholars have urged caution in addressing such matters.31  A number of Clinton 
administration vertical cases reflected these concerns, sometimes by hesitating to apply per se 
approaches32 and sometimes by focusing on vertical restraints that were alleged to have caused 
29 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
30 Reflecting in 1987 on the Reagan administration’s reduction of vertical restraints 
enforcement, Sanford Litvack observed that the shift in judicial doctrine governing distribution 
practices had led him to doubt “that government enforcement is going to change materially” in 
the future.  Sanford M. Litvack, The Future Viability of the Current Antitrust Treatment of 
Vertical Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 955, 956 (1987).  Litvack had led the Antitrust Division in 
the last years of the Carter administration and had been the last Assistant Attorney General to 
bring a criminal case against resale price maintenance.
31 See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, 
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 373-80 (2002) (reviewing economic 
arguments for and against per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance; concluding that 
“[u]ltimately . . . support for the per se rule may rest more on ideology – suspicions regarding the 
motivations of businesses and the vulnerability of consumers – than on any clear, articulate and 
empirically based economic theory”); see also Donald Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and 
Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 804 (1987) (proposing that courts 
“create one or perhaps more exceptions to the per se rule regarding minimum resale price 
maintenance”); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case For a Per Se 
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1495 (1983) (proposing recognition of 
exceptions from per se condemnation for minimum RPM agreements involving new entrants, 
new products, and failing companies). 
32 In September 2000, the FTC entered a consent order settling charges that the 
Minimum Advertised Pricing (MAP) policies of five music companies violated Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.  In a statement explaining the proposed consent orders in May 2000, the Commission 
“considered carefully whether the anticompetitive vertical restraints should be evaluated under a 
per se rule or a rule of reason.”  The Commission decided to apply the rule of reason and found 
the arrangements unlawful.  Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila 
F. Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, Time Warner Inc.,   
et al. (May 10, 2000), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/cdstatement.htm>. 
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horizontal problems that most observers would regard as reasonable subjects for scrutiny.33
Like vertical cases, dominant firm cases fell significantly during the Reagan and Bush I 
administrations.  Unlike vertical distribution matters, the Reagan agencies supported selective 
Section 2 enforcement.  The relatively limited place of these matters in the entire federal 
enforcement mix in the 1980s ought not obscure the value of DOJ’s devising and implementing 
the AT&T divestiture, one of the government’s few successes among the roster of ambitious 
Section 2 cases that began in the late 1960s and continued throughout the 1970s.  Moreover,  
American Airlines34 had a significant impact on subsequent attempted monopolization and 
horizontal restraints policy, and the concept explored in AMERCO,35 that certain abuses of 
government processes should be treated as unlawful exclusion, has great utility. 
The Clinton administration increased dominant firm prosecutions, but in numbers well 
below those prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s.  More important, the Clinton cases were not 
based on the powerful structural presumptions that had animated enforcement in the 
deconcentration cases of the late 1960s and the 1970s.  The Clinton cases generally displayed a 
substantive orientation better attuned to the analytical and institutional concerns that various 
commentators and Reagan enforcement officials had raised about earlier Section 2 enforcement 
33 See, e.g., Waterous Co., 122 F.T.C. 414 (1996) (entering consent order involving 
exclusive dealing in the sale and marketing of fire pumps); Hale Prods., 122 F.T.C. 401 (1996) 
(same).  In accepting the consent orders in Waterous and Hale Products, the Commission 
majority relied heavily on the theory that the challenged exclusive dealing arrangements 
facilitated an allocation of customers between the two pump producers.
34 United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984).
35 AMERCO, 109 F.T.C. 135 (1987).
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initiatives. Although some of the Clinton cases were controversial36 and involved difficult issues 
of law and policy,37 the FTC’s recent cases indicate bipartisan support for the principle that 
Section 2 is a valuable ingredient of federal enforcement policy, albeit one that will be used 
sparingly.38
2. A Closer Look at the Pendulum Narrative: 1981 to the Present
Proponents of the pendulum theory might argue that the enforcement agenda of the 1970s 
was an anomaly and that once the antitrust agencies adapted to the seismic changes in the 
academic and legal landscape, enforcers still swung back and forth based on the party in power.  
To test this version of the pendulum theory, we analyze enforcement since 1981, considering 
nonmerger cases first, then merger enforcement.  We will see that the pendulum theory remains 
unsupported.  There are observable variations in enforcement, but these differences cross party 
lines and appear to reflect either differences between the FTC and DOJ or the preferences of the 
various enforcement officials.
(a.) Nonmerger Cases
Since 1981, there have been six terms of office for four different Presidents.  Tables 5 
through 8 present enforcement officials for the 11 heads of the federal enforcement agencies 
during this period.  When officials served for only a short time, usually as acting heads of the 
36 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 693 (2000).
37 The government prevailed on some issues and lost on others in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 U.S. F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).  The court 
rejected the government’s claims in United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2003). 
38 The Commission’s recent dominant firm matters are recounted in Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003 Year in Review, at 3-5.  
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FTC or the Antitrust Division, their tenure is combined with that of the nearest official who 
server a longer time.  Tables 5 through 7 rank agency heads by average number of cases brought 
per year of their tenure.  Table 5 provides this data for civil horizontal restraint cases, Table 6 
covers vertical restraint cases, and Table 7 counts dominant firm cases.  Table 8 lists agency 
heads chronologically and then provides the ordinal rankings for specific types of cases from 
Tables 5 through 7.  
Table 5: Civil Horizontal Restraint Cases39
Average Cases per Year by Tenure of Agency Head
Muris 2001- 2004 (FTC) 9.8
Steiger 1989-1995 (FTC) 8.1
Miller 1981-1985 (FTC) 8.0
Bingaman 1993-1996 (DOJ) 7.0
Calvani/Oliver40 1985-1989 (FTC) 6.9
Pitofsky 1995-2001 (FTC) 6.3
Baxter/McGrath 1981-1985 (DOJ) 4.3
Rill (James/Bidley/Clark)41 1989-1993 (DOJ) 2.5
James/Pate 2001-2004 (DOJ) 1.9
Klein (Melamed)42 1996-2001 (DOJ) 1.3
39 This table omits DOJ civil horizontal restraint cases that seek to recover civil 
damages for U.S. government agencies injured by cartels that DOJ previously has challenged in 
a criminal proceeding.
40 Terry Calvani was acting FTC Chairman from October 1985 until April 1986.
41 Rill’s tenure includes 13 months in which Charles James, Mark Gidley, and John 
Clark served as Acting Assistant Attorneys General.  James/Gidley/Clark brought 4 of the10 
cases in the Rill totals. 
42 Klein’s tenure includes 9 months in which Douglas Melamed served as Acting 
Assistant Attorney General.  Melamed brought no civil horizontal restraints cases.
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Ginsburg/Rule43 1985-1989 (DOJ) 0.3
Table 5 suggests that the most significant difference is not between agency heads under 
Republican administrations versus agency heads under Democratic administrations but between 
the FTC and the DOJ.  The three most active heads were FTC chairpeople and the three least 
active headed the Antitrust Division.  Given that most of the DOJ’s horizontal nonmerger 
enforcement is criminal, this result is not surprising.
Table 6: Vertical Restraint Cases
Average Cases per Year by Tenure of Agency Head
Bingaman 1993-1996 (DOJ) 2.1
Pitofsky 1995-2001 (FTC) 1.1
Steiger 1989-1995 (FTC) 0.9
Miller 1981-1985 (FTC) 0.5
Rill (James/Bidley/Clark)44 1989-1993 (DOJ) 0.3
Baxter/McGrath 1981-1985 (DOJ) 0
Ginsburg/Rule 1985-1989 (DOJ) 0
Calvani/Oliver 1985-1989 (FTC) 0
Klein(Melamed)45 1996-2001 (DOJ) 0
Muris 2001-2004 (FTC) 0
43 The Rule, Klein, and Pate tenures in tables 5 through 8 include periods in which 
Rule, Klein, and Pate served as Acting Assistant Attorneys General before their appointments as 
Assistant Attorneys General.
44 Rill’s tenure includes 13 months in which Charles James, Mark Gidley, and John 
Clark served as Acting Assistant Attorneys General.  John Clark brought the one case (the 
Canstar Sports RPM matter) in the Rill totals. 
45 Klein’s tenure includes 9 months in which Douglas Melamed served as Acting 
Assistant Attorney General. 
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James/Pate 2001-2004 (DOJ) 0
Because so few vertical cases were brought the variations between agencies in Table 6 is 
less pronounced than it was for horizontal restraints in Table 5.  Again, there is no clear pattern 
between Democrats and Republicans.  While Janet Steiger, a Republican, and Robert Pitofsky, a 
Democrat, were two of the most aggressive enforcers in this category, their counterparts, James 
Rill and Joel Klein, did not bring vertical cases.  Unlike horizontal restraints, there is also no 
clear difference between the FTC and DOJ.  Indeed, the most (Ann Bingaman) and least (Joel 
Klein) aggressive enforcers were both at the Antitrust Division and both Clinton appointees.
Table 7: Dominant Firm Cases (Attempted Monopolization and Monopolization)
Average Cases per Year by Tenure of Agency Head
Muris 2001-2004 (FTC) 1.5
Bingaman 1993-1996 (DOJ) 1.2
Pitofsky 1995-2001 (FTC) 0.7
Klein (Melamed) 1996-2001 (DOJ) 0.6
Miller 1981-1985 (FTC) 0.5
 Baxter/McGrath 1981-1985 (DOJ) 0.3
Ginsburg/Rule 1985-1989 (DOJ) 0
Calvani/Oliver 1985-1989 (FTC) 0
Rill (James/Bidley/Clark) 1989-1993 (DOJ) 0
Steiger 1989-1995 (FTC) 0
James/Pate 2001-2004 (DOJ) 0
Like vertical cases, the dominant firm numbers in Table 7 are quite small.  The main 
difference is chronological, not political or even agency-specific: clearly the antitrust agencies 
brought more of these cases recently.
Table 8: Summary of Horizontal Restraint, Vertical Restraint, and Dominant Firm Cases
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(listed chronologically and showing rank in number of types of cases)
Average Cases per Year by Tenure of Agency Head HR       VR DF  
Baxter/McGrath 1981-1985 (DOJ) 7th tied last 6th
Miller 1981-1985 (FTC) 3rd 4th 5th
Ginsburg/Rule 1985-1989 (DOJ) last tied last tied last
Calvani/Oliver 1985-1989 (FTC) 5th tied last tied last
Rill (James/Bidley/Clark) 1989-1993 (DOJ) 8th 5th tied last
 Steiger  1989-1995 (FTC) 2nd 3rd tied last
Bingaman 1993-1996 (DOJ) 4th 1st 2nd
Klein (Melamed) 1996-2001 (DOJ) 10th tied last 4th
Pitofsky 1995-2001 (FTC) 6th 2nd 3rd
James/Pate 2001-2004 (DOJ) 9th tied last tied last
Muris 2001-2004 (FTC) 1st tied last 1st
Table 8 presents all three categories, with the numerical rank from first to last in each 
category of case.  No one agency head was the most aggressive, by case count, in all three 
categories.  Nor does the Table reveal that the Clinton Administration was obviously more 
aggressive than its GOP predecessors.  At the bottom, however, the second-term Reagan 
Antitrust Division, headed by Douglas Ginsburg and Charles Rule, was the least aggressive in 
each category.  Indeed, the charge that the Reagan Administration had no civil, nonmerger 
enforcement program was true for DOJ in those years.  The charge is demonstrably false 
however for the remaining three fourths of the Reagan appointees who each had numerous civil 
cases against horizontal restraints.  Moreover, as discussed above, Baxter and Miller prosecuted 
important dominant firm matters.
(b.) Merger Enforcement
As with non-horizontal, nonmerger enforcement, the Reagan administration contracted 
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merger enforcement policy.  Before 1980, there was a period of expansive federal enforcement 
activity – highly aggressive in the early to mid-1960s, with a noteworthy but modest effort, via 
the 1968 DOJ guidelines, by Don Turner to prevent further extensions.  The 1970s, owing to 
General Dynamics (1974) and various lower court decisions, did not feature further efforts to 
broaden the reach of merger prohibitions.  Nonetheless, the agencies neglected to retreat 
materially from flawed analytical approaches.  This is evident in the FTC’s faltering record in 
federal court merger challenges in cases filed in the years preceding the Reagan Administration.  
The indifference or hostility to modern economic developments contributed to the Commission’s 
increasing difficulty in federal court litigation involving mergers.  Between 1977 and 1983, in 
federal court merger cases the FTC won only 8 of 22 cases.46
The 1980s set a norm that has been sustained, in large part, through the 1990s.  Bill 
Baxter’s 1982 guidelines have become the established norm for evaluating mergers, widely 
accepted not only in the United States, but around the world.47  To be sure, the cumulative 
experience under the Guidelines has stimulated an evolution in enforcement patterns and some 
changes in the Guidelines.  If one learns from experience, such an evolution should be expected 
and reflects neither ideological nor personnel shifts.
Table 9: Merger Challenges as a Percentage of Hart-Scott-Rodino Filings
By Tenure of Agency Head
46 See Carol T. Crawford et al., Federal Trade Commission Law Enforcement in the 
1980s: A Progress Report on the First Three Years of the Reagan Administration Leadership 
October 1981 to October 1984 41 (Oct. 1984) (report available from the FTC Library).  The 
cases for which final judicial decisions were issued had commenced before 1981.
47 See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United 
States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002).
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Steiger 1990-1995 (FTC) 1.51%
Klein (Melamed) 1997-2000 (DOJ) 1.03%
Miller 1982-1985 (FTC) .96%
Bingaman 1994-1996 (DOJ) .92%
Baxter/McGrath 1982-1985 (DOJ) .84%
Rill, et al. 1990-1993 (DOJ) .75%
Pitofsky 1996-2000 (FTC) .75%
Calvani / Oliver 1986-1989 (FTC) .70%
Ginsburg / Rule 1986-1989 (DOJ) .39%
Table 9 repeats the categorizations of Tables 5 through 8, this time for mergers, but 
without the current enforcers.  The statistic is the number of mergers challenged as a percentage 
of Hart-Scott-Rodino filings.48  Because the filing threshold changed in March 2001, comparable 
data is no longer collected.  Although this is an admittedly crude statistic, three features of 
merger enforcement patterns stand out.  First, a close look at the data bears out the conclusion 
about the essential stability of post-1981 U.S. merger policy.  Within this general pattern there is 
only one noteworthy peak (during Janet Steiger’s FTC chairmanship) and one major valley (the 
tenures of Douglas Ginsburg and Charles Rule as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust).  
There are also some difference in the volume of enforcement events attributable to adjustments 
48 Challenge data is drawn from: (i)  FTC Mission Accomplishments for the fiscal 
years 1986 through 2000 and counts as challenges the sum of preliminary injunctions authorized, 
administrative complaints issued, FTC Part II consents accepted, and transactions withdrawn 
after issuance of a second request (in all cases, duplicate cases were eliminated); (ii) DOJ 
Workload Statistics for the years 1988 through 2000, counting as challenges the sum of merger 
actions filed in the district court and transactions abandoned or restructured prior to filing a 
complaint as a result of an announced challenge; and (iii) HSR Annual Reports filed for the 
calendar years 1982-1985 and for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 (one report), which in the text 
and footnotes describe cases brought and transactions abandoned.  Duplicate cases were  
eliminated.  In all cases, data was collected as of the date the challenge began. 
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in regulatory policy that significantly altered the type of transactions that the antitrust agencies 
reviewed.49  Because by law, only one agency can review a proposed merger, the agencies divide 
merger enforcement between them. 
The Goldilocks story incorrectly treats all federal merger enforcement during the Reagan 
administration as homogeneous.  This is perhaps a consequence of the unfortunate tendency of 
DOJ and FTC leadership during Ronald Reagan’s second term to emphasize the types of cases 
they would not bring and to mute their positive enforcement intentions.50  As with nonmerger 
enforcement, however, this view of homogeneity is incorrect.  The DOJ in President Reagan’s 
second term was a decided outlier, but the other three Reagan periods are consistent with their 
successors.  The pendulum narrative also fails to note that enforcement under an FTC chairman 
appointed during Bush I far exceeded that under President Clinton’s appointees. 
A second, related point is that merger policy from 1981 through the 1990s evolved to 
gradually give business managers greater freedom to complete mergers.  The merger guidelines 
have evolved since 1982, with amendments adopted in 1984, 1992, and 1997.  At least part of 
that evolution directly contradicts those who would argue that antitrust enforcement toughened in 
the 1990s.  During the first few years under the 1982 guidelines, the numerical thresholds were 
given more credence.  For example, in 1984, the Reagan FTC successfully challenged a merger 
49 The communications sector provides several examples.  DOJ reviewed a 
significant number of radio mergers in the 1990s and demanded remedies in some of these 
transactions.  The increase in radio mergers stemmed from a loosening of regulatory controls 
governing the number of stations a single firm could own in a particular service area.  During the 
same decade, changes in statutes and implementing regulations likewise increased the ability of 
telecommunications service providers to merge their operations.
50 See Report of the ABA Antitrust Law Section Task Force on the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice, reprinted in 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 745 (1990) (urging DOJ to 
“articulate and garner public support for a positive enforcement agenda” and recommending that 
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involving music distribution that would have reduced the number of significant competitors from 
6 to 5.51  When a 6 to 5 merger involving the same sector took place in the Clinton 
administration, the transaction cleared the FTC without a detailed investigation.52  Moreover, the 
Reagan administration’s analysis of gasoline distribution, carried out less than two years after the 
issuance of the1982 guidelines, applied a tighter numerical threshold than that of the 1990s.  In 
mergers such as Chevron/Gulf, there were many wholesale overlaps, with a range of post-merger 
Herfindahls from highly concentrated to unconcentrated.  Rather than perform a separate, 
detailed investigation in each geographic market,53 the Commission applied a rule of thumb for 
requiring divestitures.  Presumptively, divestitures were sought when the Herfindahls exceeded 
1000 – the beginning of the guidelines’ mid-range of concentration – and the delta exceeded 100.  
Since that time, the agencies have not obtained relief in markets with such a low HHI.  
Fealty to the guideline numerical levels was abandoned as the agencies gained 
experience.  Particularly in 1992, the guidelines were amended to codify the existing practice of 
giving more weight to qualitative factors.  The 1982 and 1984 guidelines had given more 
emphasis to quantitative thresholds, particularly involving concentration levels above the 1800 
HHI boundary.54  The 1992 guidelines reduced the significance of the 1800 threshold by inviting 
the Division end “non-enforcement rhetoric”).
51 FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
52 Charles Piller, Seagram Gets U.S. Ok to Buy Polygram, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 
1998, at D2.  
53 The merging parties were anxious to close the transaction and did not desire such 
investigations.
54 The 1982 guidelines denominated markets with a post-merger HHI of 1800 or 
more as “highly concentrated.”  The significance of the HHI thresholds employed in the 1982 
guidelines thresholds is examined in ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 12, Horizontal 
26
fuller consideration of other conditions that helped predict whether price increases were likely in 
the post merger period.55
A third observation concerns the tendency to criticize Reagan-era merger policy on the 
ground that lax enforcement helped spur the merger wave of the 1980s.56  If Reagan antitrust 
policy contributed to the merger wave of the 1980s, what is one to conclude about antitrust 
policy in the 1990s – a decade in which a still larger merger wave transpired?  Antitrust policy 
has virtually nothing to do with the overall level of merger activity in the economy, a completely 
Mergers: Law and Policy 196-97 (1986). 
55 Compare the language of the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines to the language of 
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  In 1982, the guidelines stated that, for mergers that 
would result in a post merger HHI above 1800, the Department of Justice was “likely to 
challenge mergers ... that produce an increase in the HHI of 100 points or more.”  United States 
Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶ 
13,102 at § 3.A.1.  In 1984, the Department of Justice made it clear that, even at the 1800/100 
level, other factors, such as ease of entry, the financial condition of firms, and changing market 
conditions, would be considered in determining whether an enforcement action was warranted.  
However, only in “extraordinary cases w[ould] such factors establish that the merger is not likely 
to substantially less competition.”  United States Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (June 14, 
1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103 at § 3.11.
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines went much further to limit the importance of 
concentration statistics, indicating only that there was “a presumption” that mergers at the 
1800/100 level “are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise”. “[T]he 
presumption [could] be overcome” by a showing that other factors, such as entry, make it 
unlikely that the merger will have an anticompetitive effect.”  United States Dep't of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 at § 1.51. 
56 Commentaries that identify lax merger enforcement as a stimulus for the merger 
wave of the 1980s include Milton Handler, Is Antitrust’s Centennial a Time for Obsequies or for 
Renewed Faith in Its National Policy?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1933, 1940 (1989) (“Hardly a day 
passes without news accounts of massive mergers or takeovers of dubious legality which go 
unchallenged and which produce a chain reaction in stimulating waves of new acquisitions.”); 
Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321, 326 (1987) (“A more 
vigorous, pragmatic antitrust enforcement policy should be restored.  The most pressing area is 
merger nonenforcement – far more permissive these days than the Administration’s own 
guidelines – where failures to act and loose rhetoric have contributed to a foolish and wasteful 
surge of giant consolidations.”).
27
unsurprising fact given that only a few mergers present significant antitrust concerns.  The 
mergers of the 1990s were not somehow more benign or procompetitive than the mergers of the 
1980s.  What occurred in both decades was a process of restructuring that permitted U.S. firms to 
adjust to fundamental changes in the economy at home and abroad.  Antitrust policy throughout 
this period gave most merging firms the ability to realize efficiencies while opposing 
transactions that threatened to create or reinforce market power.
C. Limitations of the Pendulum Narrative
Beyond its failure to find support in case counts, the pendulum narrative suffers from 
three particularly serious limitations.  The first is that it attributes policy adjustments over time 
mainly to political affiliation and to the idiosyncratic preferences of individual enforcement 
officials (“ideology”).  This approach ignores important institutional factors that lead 
competition authorities to change direction.  Second, the pendulum narrative pays little attention 
to activities other than the prosecution of cases – and usually “big” cases, at that.  Non-litigation 
activities that have a major impact on public policy, such as the FTC’s Generic Drug study,57 are 
overlooked.  Less-obviously significant cases, such as Indiana Federation of Dentists58 and Ticor 
Title Insurance,59 that alter doctrine are deemed irrelevant.
Third, the narrative derives its power by accentuating swings across different periods.  
This inspires an exaggeration of differences across periods by obliterating facts that do not fit 
57 See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: 
An FTC Study (July 2002), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf>.
This study led the FDA to change its rules and the Congress to enact new legislation.
58 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (clarifying application of 
the Rule of Reason).
59 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (clarifying application of the 
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neatly the story of polar extremes.  It also causes narrators to treat each administration as 
unrelated to periods before and after.   In baseball terms, individual administrations do not 
always pitch “complete games” in prosecuting cases or pursuing other initiatives.  Matters begun 
in one administration often spill over into another.  The contributions of two or more 
administrations frequently determine the outcome of the entire initiative.  If baseball kept track 
of pitching statistics in a manner comparable to the pendulum narrative, it would count the total 
number of starts without counting saves.  
II. Understanding the Development of Modern Federal Enforcement Policy
A fundamental reason to review past experience is to improve our understanding about 
how to formulate sensible competition policies.  This section identifies a number of lessons from 
our experience over the past four decades. 
A. The Need for Continuous Reassessment
There is a temptation to attribute policy choices that we know ex post to be misguided to 
the irrationality of individual decision makers or institutions.  To say that organizations or 
agency officials are irrational can be appealing, but it hardly explains the problem of bad policy 
choices.  The more interesting issue is why smart people sometimes make bad choices.  The 
challenge is to identify avoidable errors and to suggest how to avoid future missteps. 
One avoidable error for an antitrust agency is to pay too little attention to developments in 
economic learning and industry conditions that undermine existing or contemplated enforcement 
programs.  This section will use three examples from the 1970s: the experience with dominant 
firm misconduct/shared monopoly, vertical restraints, and merger efficiencies.  In each case, 
there are failures to take account of new developments that cast doubt upon the wisdom of 
State Action Doctrine).
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investing substantial resources for enforcement in these areas.
1. Dominant Firm Misconduct
From the late 1960s until Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, the DOJ and the FTC 
maintained an ambitious agenda of monopolization and attempted monopolization initiatives that 
proposed structural remedies to erode the market positions of dominant firms in a wide swath of 
the American economy.  This enforcement stemmed from considerably more than brute 
populism.  Many measures later criticized as simple-minded assaults upon corporate size 
employed what their sponsors viewed to be mainstream economic thinking.60
The deconcentration impetus of the period rested upon economic literature that found a 
strong positive relationship between concentration and profitability, and suggested that 
enforcement policy be based on simple market concentration numbers.61  Industries with high 
concentration ratios were presumed to perform poorly, particularly if accounting profits were 
high.  The doctrine gave little weight to the possibility that lower costs might explain any 
60 See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain 
Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1136-41 
(1989) (discussing intellectual foundations for antitrust deconcentration initiatives pursued in the 
late 1960s and in the 1970s).
61 One highly influential scholarly work in this period was Carl Kaysen's and 
Donald Turner's Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis, which appeared in 1959.  
Kaysen and Turner wrote that "The principal defect of present antitrust law is its inability to cope 
with market power created by jointly acting oligopolists."  Id. at 110. They urged Congress to 
adopt new legislation compelling the deconcentration of various sectors of the economy.  Id. at 
110-19, 261-66.  In 1969, a blue ribbon presidential task force headed by Dean Phil Neal of the 
University of Chicago recommended deconcentration variants of the Kaysen and Turner 
proposals.  See White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 2 A NTITRUST L. 
& ECON. REV. 11, 14-15, 65-76 (1968-69). Task force members who endorsed the 
deconcentration measure included such prominent academics as Dean Neal, William Baxter, 
William K. Jones, Paul MacAvoy, James McKie, Lee Preston, and James Rahl. 
30
superior profitability of large firms.62
A striking number of the FTC’s most important antitrust cases in the 1970s reflected the 
teaching of this simple market concentration doctrine.63   Early in the decade, the FTC ranked 
industries with a model developed primarily to attack concentrated industries.  The agency 
undertook numerous industry-wide cases, including the breakfast cereals case, petroleum 
industry litigation, and a massive investigation of the automobile industry.  In the cereals case, 
for example, the Commission alleged a shared monopoly in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereals 
industry and argued that heavy advertising, product and package-size proliferation, and shelf 
allocation plans were the principal barriers to entry.64
The analytical foundations for the agencies’ cases rested upon theories of coordination 
and exclusion that failed to grapple with then-recent developments in industrial organization 
economics.  It would be an unfair simplification to say the agencies merely followed  a simple-
minded belief that large firms were a menace -- although that was the policy import of the model, 
the model was more sophisticated and had several respected adherents in the competition policy 
community.  The problem was that the model on which the agencies relied decisively was 
62
 It also drew heavily from studies indicating that a deconcentration program was 
unlikely to sacrifice significant scale economies or other efficiencies.  Kovacic, Failed 
Expectations, supra note 60, at 1136, (citing Leonard Weiss, The Concentration - Profits 
Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184-272 
(1974)).  See also F. SCHERER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATIONS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY (1975); Roger Sherman & Robert Tollison, Public Policy 
Toward Oligopoly: Dissolution and Scale Economies, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 77, 78 
(Summer 1971).
63 See, e.g., Wesley Liebeler, Bureau of Competition: Antitrust Enforcement 
Activities, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND 
BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 65-73 (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, eds. 1981).
64 Id.
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crumbling. The more accurate and sobering characterization of the FTC’s mistake in pursuing 
this initiative, which consumed vast agency resources, was that the Commission launched and 
expanded it in the face of growing evidence that the program’s analytical basis was losing 
intellectual support.
The shared monopoly and other theories used in the 1970s to attack concentration became 
discredited.  The FTC’s motivation to reassess the validity of these enforcement approaches did 
not come from independent, internal reassessment.  Instead, the imperative to change came from 
developments taking place within the federal courts in the mid- to late-1970s.  The decision of 
the court of appeals in Berkey Photo65 punctuated the judiciary’s attitude about antitrust policy 
toward dominant firms.  In the course of exonerating Eastman Kodak of liability for 
monopolization, the Second Circuit stated:
A large firm does not violate § 2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable 
to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman Act whenever one of its 
departments benefits from association with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market.  
So long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive 
advantages of its broad-based activity – more efficient production, greater ability to develop 
complementary products, reduced transaction costs, and so forth.66
The caution expressed in Berkey and other judicial decisions was reinforced by economic 
research indicating that deconcentration might actually raise prices and lower quality because 
many firms gained larger market share through lower costs or higher quality, rather than through 
65 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979).
66 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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practices that harmed consumers.  A harbinger of the distintegration of the intellectual basis for 
deconcentration of the economy was the 1974 Airlie House conference on “the new learning” 
about industrial concentration.  Structured as a debate about deconcentration policy, this 
conference supplied a forum for opponents to synthesize and highlight the literature that 
challenged the underlying economic assumptions of deconcentration policies.67  Among the most 
important themes was that, contrary to the conventional view of bigness, superior performance 
not only could, but typically did, account for large firms achieving and maintaining large market 
shares over time.68   The Airlie House conference and subsequent academic attacks on the 
structural model and its policy proposals severely weakened the intellectual support for 
deconcentration.69
Despite the growing evidence of the flaws in the deconcentration program, the agencies 
not only continued their misguided efforts, they expanded them.  Two initiatives are especially 
noteworthy.  The first was the FTC’s automobile investigation.  Formally begun in the Summer 
of 1976, the effort was built upon the agency staff’s endorsement of the horizontal and vertical 
dismemberment of the industry leader (General Motors) and its belief that the second and third 
members of the American "Big Three" (Chrysler and Ford) could be worthy candidates for 
divestiture as well.  
The auto industry investigation collapsed of its own weight and marketplace realities in 
67 See Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 60, at 1138.  The proceedings of the 
conference were published in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (1974).
68 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 163-97 (1978).
69 See, e.g., Paul Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis for a Broad-Based 
Horizontal Merger Policy, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (1983) (reviewing relevant literature).
33
May 1981.70 One can take some satisfaction from the Commission’s eventual recognition that the 
inquiry’s premises were faulty and the investigation should end.  Nonetheless, it is sobering that 
the FTC did not perceive fundamental flaws in the undertaking when it began in 1976. 
Contemporary economic learning had raised grave doubts about the simple market concentration 
doctrine.  Moreover, the rapidly changing market environment should have aroused suspicion 
about the staff’s assessment of competition in the automobile sector.71
The second example of the antitrust agencies’ failure to follow the developments in the 
law, the academy, and the marketplace is even more surprising and less defensible.  Despite the 
cautions from the new learning about deconcentration, proposals to restructure dominant firms 
using no-fault theories of liability received considerable attention in the late 1970s.  In 1979 
President Carter’s National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures 
(NCRALP) recommended amendment of the Sherman Act to redress monopoly power not 
70 For a discussion of the background and conclusion of the FTC’s automobile 
investigation, see Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Improving the 
Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, Remarks at the George Mason University Law 
Review’s Winter Antitrust Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 15, 2003), available at, 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm>.
71 At least three specific developments concerning the auto industry undermined the 
FTC's staff approach. The first was John McGee's 1973 article, Economies of Size in Auto Body 
Manufacture, 16 J.L. & ECON. 239 (1973), which persuasively argued that much of GM's 
success derived from its ability to spread the enormous costs of setting up dies to stamp out auto 
body parts across a much larger volume than its competitors.  A second real world phenomenon 
that undermined the rationale for the auto industry inquiry was growing foreign competition. 
Surprisingly, the FTC proponents of restructuring the U.S. producers dismissed foreign suppliers 
as likely to have little competitive impact. A third phenomenon that undercut the case for 
conducting an investigation was uncertainty over gasoline prices. The crude oil price shock of 
1973-74 had increased gasoline prices dramatically and had given an enormous boost to sales of 
fuel efficient vehicles. This spurred imports, particularly from Japan.
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attributable to continuing superior performance.72 Before NCRALP and in other forums, leading 
FTC officials endorsed the no-fault concept.73  Contemporaneous news accounts indicate that the 
Commission staff was investigating possible candidates for a Section 5 proceeding that would 
apply a no-fault liability standard.74  The agencies’ stubborn adherence to discredited 
deconcentration theories in the late 1970s is one of the worst mistakes in antitrust’s long history. 
2. Distribution Restraints
In the 1960s federal antitrust policy displayed acute skepticism toward vertical 
distribution restraints.75  Two cases underscore the attitude of the federal enforcers.  In Federal 
Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co.,76 the FTC successfully used Section 5 of the FTC Act to 
attack an exclusive dealing arrangement that resulted in a vertical foreclosure of less than one 
72 1 Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission 
for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures viii-ix (1979) [hereinafter NCRALP Report]. 
73 See id. at 152 &  n. 34 (reporting that FTC submitted statement endorsing no-fault 
monopolization concept and recommending passage of legislation to permit no-fault causes of 
action); Robert Pitofsky, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, In Defense of ‘No Fault 
Monopoly’ Proposals, Presentation Before the 20th Annual Law Symposium of the Columbia 
University Law School (Mar. 31, 1979) (defending no-fault monopolization concept).
74 See James W. Singer, Should the FTC Break Up Monopolies Even If They Have 
Done Nothing Wrong?, NAT’L L. J., Sept. 27, 1980, at 1609 (discussing FTC inquiry into 
possible no-fault monopolization claims against Campbell Soup, Eastman Kodak, Gerber, and 
Proctor & Gamble).
75 In a representative statement of this attitude in 1966, as Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust, Donald Turner remarked that he approached vertical "territorial and 
customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition 
of antitrust law."  Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, in 1966 N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 1, 1–2 (1966).
76 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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percent.77  The Commission expressed alarm that “[o]f the approximately 1,000 shoe 
manufacturers in 1959, the top 70 manufacturers accounted for approximately 54 percent of the 
shoe production.”78  The five largest producers, the Commission added, produced 24 percent of 
shoes made in 1959.79  Responding to Brown Shoe’s argument that its exclusive dealing 
contracts improved the performance of the firm’s production and marketing operations, the 
Commission said that efficiency considerations were irrelevant to evaluate the legality of the 
arrangements.80
The Justice Department in the 1960s was no less enthusiastic about attacking such 
restrictions.  It was the Antitrust Division’s case, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,81 that 
77 The distribution program at issue in Brown Shoe affected 766 of the 70,000 U.S. 
stores classified as retail shoe outlets.  Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 697, 711-12 (1963).  The 
economic conditions of the shoe industry at the time of the case are examined in detail in John 
Peterman, The Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Company, 18 J.L. & ECON. 361 
(1975). 
78 Brown Shoe, 62 F.T.C. at 717-18.
79 Id.
80 The Commission observed:
We need not concern ourselves here with the arguments of respondent and 
counsel supporting the complaint about the intrinsic economic merits of line 
concentration against the advantages of selecting only the best items from several 
lines in the same price and style ranges. . . .
The economic justification, if any, of line concentration is irrelevant to the 
issues presented to us here.  While line concentration itself may or may not be 
economically justifiable, there is no economic justification for making the 
adherence to this doctrine the subject of agreement between buyer and seller and 
enforcing the agreement to the latter’s advantage.
Id. at 709.
81 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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provided the vehicle for the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1967 that all nonprice vertical restraints 
were illegal per se.82  The policies of the two enforcement agencies gradually diverged in the 
years before Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,83 which reversed Schwinn in 1977 and 
held that the rule of reason governed all nonprice vertical restraints.  In the early 1970s, the 
Justice Department prosecuted a substantial number of vertical restraints cases, including 
challenges to tying, reciprocal dealing, exclusive dealing, and resale price maintenance (RPM).  
By the mid-1970s, however, attention to new economic literature on the economic consequences 
of vertical restraints, much of it focusing on the role of vertical restraints in reducing transaction 
costs, appears to have led the Antitrust Division to use its discretion not to challenge nonprice 
arrangements.84  Vertical restraints became a diminishing focal point of DOJ’s enforcement 
program, although the Antitrust Division did take the jarring step in 1980 of initiating a criminal 
82 Id. at 376-82.
83 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
84 Thomas Kauper, who headed the Antitrust Division from 1974 to 1976, has
described DOJ’s thinking at the time:
[I]n the years I served as Assistant Attorney General, vertical territorial 
restrictions were per se illegal, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.  The rule made no economic sense.  We 
brought no such cases, explaining that the conduct was overt, that those allegedly 
harmed knew that they were “victims” and had all the facts necessary for 
application of a per se rule at their disposal, that a private remedy was readily 
available and there was therefore no reason to expend the Division’s resources on 
such cases.
Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or 
Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 99 (1990).  More generally, Kauper’s tenure is probably 
the most important of any Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust during the 1970s.  In addition 
to retrenching the Antitrust Division’s vertical restraints program, Kauper filed the AT&T
monopolization case and began the effort, sustained by his successors, to apply vigorously the 
stiffened Sherman Act criminal sanctions established by Congress in 1974.
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suit against Cuisinarts for minimum RPM.85
In contrast to the DOJ’s experience, the FTC’s vertical restraints program remained 
vigorous throughout the 1970s.86  The Commission prosecuted numerous vertical matters, with 
many involving products– such as stereo equipment, hearing aids, ski bindings, and firearms –
that require the production of some information or demonstrations at the point of sale to aid 
consumers in making informed purchasing decisions.  To avoid free-riding on the information or 
services provided by the resellers, manufacturers restricted distribution to allow their resellers to 
reap a return on their efforts.  The principal effect of FTC orders in a significant number of these 
cases was probably to force manufacturers to use less efficient means for providing point of sale 
information or services.
As noted above, in 1977 the Supreme Court reversed Schwinn in Sylvania, bowing to “the 
great weight of scholarly opinion critical of [Schwinn]” and requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate 
the anticompetitive effect of vertical restraints, particularly their effect on interbrand 
competition.87  The FTC, however, refused to abandon its attack on nonprice vertical restraints.  
In a 1978 decision involving soft drinks, the Commission stubbornly ignored the new learning 
endorsed in Sylvania the year before. The Commission had brought administrative complaints in 
1971 against manufacturers of concentrate for carbonated soft drinks (including Coca-Cola, 
Pepsi-Cola, and their bottlers) to eliminate the use of exclusive vertical territories in the 
85 The matter was resolved with a consent decree.  United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 63,979 (D. Conn. 1981).
86 See Liebeler, Antitrust Enforcement Activities, supra note 63, at 74. 
87 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977).
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industry.88  The complaints alleged that the exclusive territories unreasonably restrained trade 
because they eliminated competition among bottlers, eliminated competition in the sale and 
distribution of carbonated soft drinks at the wholesale level, deprived retailers and other 
customers of the right to purchase from the bottler of their choice at competitive prices, and 
denied consumers the opportunity to obtain carbonated soft drinks in an unrestricted market at 
competitive prices.  
An FTC administrative law judge, reading Schwinn narrowly, upheld the use of exclusive 
territories under the rule of reason as leading to greater competition in the carbonated soft drink 
industry.  Nonetheless, the Commission reversed and held that the restrictions unreasonably 
restrained trade.89  Despite the intervening Supreme Court decision in Sylvania and compelling 
evidence that competition in the carbonated soft drink industry in the presence of territorial 
restraints had rapidly expanded sales, reduced real prices, and developed innovative marketing, 
packaging, and products, the Commission majority focused on the alleged anticompetitive 
absence of intrabrand competition.  The Commission’s attack on the lack of intrabrand 
competition thus ignored not only Sylvania’s decree that interbrand competition was antitrust’s 
main focus, but also the powerful efficiency justifications for exclusive territories and the then-
raging Cola Wars.90
88 Similar complaints were also issued against Crush International, Beverages 
International, Dr Pepper Co., Seven-Up Co., Royal Crown Cola Co., National Industries, Inc., 
and Cott Corporation.  On March 13, 1972, similar complaints also were issued against Canada 
Dry and Norton Simon, Inc.
89 See The Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
90 See TIMOTHY J. MURIS ET AL., STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND ANTITRUST IN THE 
CARBONATED SOFT-DRINK INDUSTRY (1993) (describing FTC soft drink cases and detailing 
efficiency rationales for challenged restrictions).  The unintended result of the FTC’s decision 
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The Commission’s unwillingness to acknowledge a basic shift in commentary and 
doctrine also was evident in its case against Russell Stover Candies, Inc.91  In July 1980, the 
Commission sought to extend the reach of the per se ban on resale price maintenance first 
established in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.92  Specifically, the Russell 
Stover case was consciously designed to overturn the rule in United States v. Colgate & Co.93
that declined to find an agreement for Sherman Act purposes when a manufacturer announces in 
advance the circumstances in which it will not sell and proceeds to terminate distributors who do 
not comply with its policy.94
By a 3-1 vote, the Commission found liability.  Although its decision had left the per se 
rule against RPM in place, the Supreme Court only three years earlier in Sylvania had cautioned 
against extensions of per se rules and had stated that the establishment of a per se rule must be 
based on “demonstrable economic effect.”95  Vindicating the position of the dissenting 
commissioner,96 the Eighth Circuit subsequently declined the Commission’s invitation to 
was special federal legislation to protect the exclusive territories of carbonated soft drink 
bottlers.  See Soft Drink Intrabrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3501 (1986).
91 Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982) (finding liability), enforcement 
denied, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
92 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
93 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
94 Id. at 307.  The initial decision of the administrative law judge in Russell Stover
documents that the Commission intended the case as a frontal assault on Colgate.  Russell 
Stover, 100 F.T.C. at 7 (initial decision) (observing that “[c]omplaint counsel have come up with 
a test case which has as its purpose a direct challenge to the continued viability of Colgate”). 
95 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
96 FTC Chairman James C. Miller III dissented from the Commission’s finding of 
liability and repudiation of Colgate.  Russell Stover, 100 F.T.C. at 50-53.
40
overturn Colgate.97  The FTC declined to seek Supreme Court review of the court of appeals 
decision.  The wisdom of this self-restraint, a step that attracted criticism from those who wished 
to topple Colgate, soon was demonstrated in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,98 in 
which the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Colgate.
The 1970s presented the FTC with an opportunity to encourage the retreat from 
distribution restraints enforcement that commentary and judicial decisions, at least since Sylvania
in 1977, had recognized as at odds with sound economic analysis.  The Commission’s distinctive 
array of institutional capabilities – for example, its research and analysis functions, its extensive 
complement of industrial organization economists, and its administrative litigation process –
provided means for fostering a reassessment.  To be sure, the Commission did take some steps to 
perform this role, particularly through the initiation in the late 1970s of ex post evaluations of the 
effects of some of its vertical cases.99  The Commission’s litigation program, however, resisted 
these developments in the literature and the courts.  Rather than help lead a reassessment in the 
1970s of enforcement policy, the courts forced the Commission to acknowledge the new 
learning.     
3. Merger Efficiencies
Before the dramatic shift in antitrust thinking affected policy, efficiencies were ignored or 
97 Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
98 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
99 See Federal Trade Commission, Impact Evaluations of Federal Trade 
Commission Vertical Restraints Cases (Ronald N. Lafferty et al., eds. 1984) (presenting results 
of FTC ex post evaluations); see also Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982) (dismissing 
complaint challenging exclusive dealing arrangement).
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treated as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor.100   Consolidation was felt to be 
inherently undesirable in the quest to preserve numerous small businesses.  Exacerbating this 
state of affairs was the difficulty the enforcement agencies and the courts had in recognizing the 
existence of efficiencies other than economies of scale.  An academic work – Economics as an 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs101 –  that connected Ronald Coase’s 1937 article on 
The Nature of the Firm102 to antitrust analysis was a harbinger of change for the importance of 
efficiencies as a positive factor in merger analysis.  Other economists, courts, and eventually 
antitrust enforcement officials eventually embraced this new learning on efficiencies.  
The enforcement pendulum has not swung back against efficiencies.103  Neither is this a 
static development.  Instead, understanding about the types and impacts of efficiencies continues 
to evolve.  Historically, what is striking is the extent to which the “efficiency is bad” view or the 
more indifferent “efficiencies do not count” perspective prevailed at the FTC in merger analysis 
well into the 1970s.  One survey of FTC decisions taken from 1970 to 1977 shows that the 
administrative law judge or the Commission made arguments that efficiencies created by a 
merger should count against its legality or that the absence of such efficiency creation should 
100 See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, 
Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution, Remarks Before the ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law 2002 Fall Forum (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/efficienciesandantitrust.htm>.
101 Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
102 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
103 See Leary, Essential Stability, supra note 4, at 118-19.
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weigh in favor of legality in 8 of the 18 cases litigated to disposition at the Commission level.104
None of the 18 cases even considered the possibility that increased efficiency should count in 
favor of the merger’s legality.  As was the case with dominant firm and distribution restraints 
cases, the agency lagged the courts in aligning merger enforcement with the new economically-
oriented literature that called for a realignment of policy.  
B. Matching Commitments to Capabilities
Too often, the effectiveness of federal antitrust policy in any one period is measured by 
the number and visibility of cases that the government pursued.  Special credit is given to matters 
that capture broad public attention.  Contributions from “smaller” cases or from an agency’s 
application of non-litigation policy instruments are largely disregarded.  A subsidiary principal is 
that a failure to generate a significant number of high profile cases indicates ideological rigidity 
or a paucity of political fortitude.
Experience with modern antitrust policy shows that these critiques ignore the need to 
evaluate an agency’s competition policy commitments in light of its institutional capabilities.  In 
this regard, there are at least two blind spots.  First, the cramped view of what activity matters –
principally litigation – discourages careful consideration of the full range of capabilities an 
agency might use to address a competition policy problem.  A case-centric perspective, with its 
emphasis on attention-grabbing prosecutions, at least implicitly discourages an agency’s efforts 
to consider how best to apply other tools within its control.
The second failing is to ignore the consequences of prosecutorial commitments that 
significantly outrun an agency’s capability.  A given litigation program can create a serious 
problem either by taking on so many matters that the agency lacks the human capital to execute 
104 See Liebeler, Antitrust Enforcement Activities, supra note 63, at 94.
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them well or by pursuing cases that enjoy respectable theoretical support but involve 
implementation issues likely to prove overwhelming in the prosecution of actual matters.
Incumbent enforcement officials also should be evaluated by the actual results achieved.  
Managers who ignore this issue could make litigation commitments without adequate regard for 
the longer term consequences for the agency and for public policy.  In the midst of activity for 
which they can claim credit immediately (i.e., bringing cases), managers may underinvest in 
other initiatives (e.g., advocacy and research) that benefit the agency and the public in the longer 
term, or they may fail to recognize that the quality of competition policy will improve if the 
agency conducts fewer cases skillfully rather than prosecuting more cases poorly.
Three issues that emerge from modern enforcement experience illustrate these capability 
issues.  The first deals with the hazards of undertaking litigation that is unduly expansive either 
because the sheer volume of ambitious matters exceeds the agency’s reach or because the 
theories on which the cases rely place unsupportable demands on the agency’s ability to make 
fine distinctions between acceptable and prohibited behavior.105  The second issue involves 
changes in the competition policy community that press toward expanding antitrust enforcement 
regardless of institutional capability.  The final issue is the danger that a case-centric conception 
of proper competition policy retards the development and application of other policy tools that 
should be part of a comprehensive strategy for addressing complex competition questions.  
1. The FTC Antitrust Policy in the 1970s: Many Bridges Too Far
To consider the pitfalls of overextension, consider the FTC’s antitrust agenda of 25 years 
105 See William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan 
Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger 
Cases, 12 RES. L. & ECON. 173, 182-92 (1989) (discussing how limits on an antitrust agency’s 
institutional capacity constrain its ability to prosecute cases successfully).  
44
ago involving dominant firms.  Table 10 indicates the monopolization or attempted 
monopolization cases the FTC had initiated and was pursuing as of 1979:
Table 10: FTC Dominant Firm Cases and Industry-Wide Inquiries Pending (Nov. 1978)
MatterComplaint Issued
Kellogg 1972
Exxon 1973
Borden (ReaLemon) 1974
ITT (Bread) 1974
General Foods (Coffee) 1976
Official Airline Guides 1976
Automobiles106 1976 (inquiry begun)
Sunkist 1977
DuPont (Titanium Dioxide) 1978
Most of these matters sought structural relief in the form of divestitures or mandatory 
licensing of trademarks or other intellectual property.107  This list, of course, does not capture the 
full ambition in the FTC’s competition program in the 1970s.  It omits noteworthy cases not 
involving dominant firms – such as AMA, Boise Cascade, Ethyl, and the soft drink bottlers cases 
– that the FTC had initiated and was then pursuing.  
As discussed above, there are strong doubts about the conceptual basis for most matters 
on this list.  In addition, there is a separate, important institutional point to be made.  Even if one 
believed in the wisdom of deconcentration and the structuralist approach to competition policy, 
there is something wrong with this picture.  As the FTC added items to its agenda, one wonders 
how much attention was given to whether it had the institutional capability to bring them to a 
successful conclusion.  If you believe it was sensible to attempt one shared monopoly case 
106 Although it is the only nonlitigation matter on the list, the automobile 
investigation involved an enormous resource commitment.
107 Matters on this list in which the Commission sought divestitures or mandatory 
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(Kellogg), was it wise to begin a second bet-your-agency case of the same type (Exxon) and start 
a massive investigation that contemplated a third (automobiles)?  If you thought it was important 
for the FTC to develop a case to explore predatory pricing doctrine (ITT), was it wise to add two 
more resource-intensive and analytically demanding cases of the same type (General Foods and 
ReaLemon)?  And what about supplementing the list with two novel cases testing the boundary 
of exclusionary practices doctrine (OAG and DuPont), and a matter involving important and 
sensitive competition concerns in the agricultural cooperative field (Sunkist)?
How this chapter of FTC history ended is well known.  The outcome of these attacks on 
“dominance” raised pervasive doubts about the institutional capabilities of the Commission to 
handle them successfully.   As a group, the deconcentration-minded cases were so ambitious and 
sweeping in their economic aims that the agencies' capabilities were dramatically overtaxed.108
In the 1970s, the FTC would have been far better off had it accepted an enforcement norm to 
choose a smaller number of matters and handle them well.  Is it any surprise that, given the 
discouraging results of the 1970s program and out of concern about the capability of the 
institution, the Reagan FTC reevaluated its commitment to dominant firm matters? 
The Reagan Justice Department’s approach to dominant firm cases was quite different.  
Bill Baxter asked which of the cases he inherited were worth continuing.  Making AT&T the 
center of attention and committing the resources needed to design and implement an effective 
remedy were sensible.  Asking fundamental questions about the causes of failure of so many 
mainstays of the dominant firm campaign of the 1970s was responsible.  Diagnosing the reasons 
licensing of intellectual property include Exxon, Kellogg, ReaLemon, Sunkist, and DuPont.
108 The DOJ’s dominant firm program in the late 1960s and in the 1970s was as 
ambitious.  From 1969 to 1974, the DOJ committed itself to restructuring the world's leading 
computer producer, the country's two leading tire producers, and the world's largest telephone 
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for failure and reassessing the capabilities of the federal agencies were appropriate steps before 
beginning new dominant firm initiatives.
Another perspective on the fit between commitments and capabilities is to review the 
number of FTC cases in the 1970s that involved what could be called novel or high risk areas of 
the law.  These include the facilitating practices cases (Boise Cascade and Ethyl), shared 
monopoly (Exxon and Kellogg), duty to deal (OAG), strategic entry deterrence (DuPont), and the 
attack on Colgate (Russell Stover).  In terms of risk and relative novelty, the AMA professions 
litigation also belongs on the list.  Reciting these matters and the dominant firm cases listed 
above should not suggest that a competition authority should avoid matters that involve high 
doctrinal or commercial stakes.  Rather, it is serves to highlight what happens when the agency 
adds new cases without concern for its capacity to execute them and when its portfolio of 
activities becomes particularly rich in initiatives that involve greater degrees of risk owing to 
their conceptual foundations or commercial complexity.
A further way to test an agency’s sensitivity to institutional capability is to examine the 
outcomes of litigation.  The FTC’s record in antitrust litigation in the federal courts took a 
disastrous turn in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Reflecting the “new learning,” federal courts 
overturned an alarming percentage of the FTC’s antitrust cases brought before them.  Between 
1977 and 1983, the Commission won just 13 of 35 substantive antitrust cases in federal court.  
By contrast, between 1970 and 1976, the Commission won 21 of the 23 antitrust cases heard on 
appeal.109  In a striking number of instances, the courts were extremely critical of the 
system. 
109 See Carol T. Crawford et al., Federal Trade Commission Law Enforcement in the 
1980s: A Progress Report on the First Three Years of the Reagan Administration Leadership 
October 1981 to October 1984 41 (Oct. 1984) (report available from the FTC Library).  
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Commission’s analysis.110
The most influential law and economics scholars have realized a fundamental principle 
concerning the link between economic analysis and competition policy. The insights of 
economics have their greatest impact on antitrust law and policy when contained in workable 
rules and analytical techniques for evaluating business conduct.  The suitability of an economic 
hypothesis for shaping antitrust doctrine must include whether the hypothesis lends itself to 
standards that courts and enforcement agencies can administer effectively.  The importance of 
administrability is evident for those who have played a central role in shaping antitrust doctrine 
and policy in the past few decades. Many of the strongest contributions have come from scholars 
who realized the importance of translating economic concepts into practical rules and analytical 
techniques that courts and enforcement agencies could apply successfully.111
2. Pressures for Expanding the Enforcement Agenda
As argued above, the commencement of cases, rather than the actual ability of an agency 
to execute the matters skillfully, has counted too much in the assessment of agency performance. 
This enforcement norm is one of multiple forces that press toward more extensive enforcement.  
In recent years, an increasing number of parties also have pushed hard for expansions of 
antitrust. Included in the group are certain businesses.  There was once a general impression that 
110 For example, in Fruehauf, the Second Circuit held that the Commission’s finding 
was based on “speculation rather than fact” and that its legal conclusion was a “non sequitur” 
that “flies in the face of undisputed contrary evidence.” Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 
355, 359 (2d Cir. 1979).   
111 See William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines: Lessons from 1982, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 19-20 (2000) (discussing importance of administrability to success of DOJ 
1982 Merger Guidelines); William E. Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30 
ECON. INQUIRY 294, 298-99 (1992) (describing influence of economically sophisticated 
commentators who distilled economic concepts into operational legal rules).  
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business generally favored limited rather than expanded enforcement.  Nevertheless, many 
businesses have since found that use of the government, rather than the market, can assure them 
success against their competitors, actual or potential.  It was perhaps inevitable that this activity 
– called “rent seeking” by economists – would spread to antitrust.  And so it has.  During the last 
decade, prominent antitrust lawyers – including some who earlier had made major contributions 
in support of the new economic learning – increasingly have undertaken the representation of 
firms seeking to block or restructure transactions of their competitors.  Although competitors can 
occasionally provide useful information to the government, particularly in Section 2 cases, this 
development poses a considerable danger for antitrust’s future.  Given that extensive incentives 
for expanded enforcement already exist, it threatens to nudge antitrust back to an emphasis on 
the welfare of individual competitors rather than the welfare of consumers.
The current state of modern industrial organization economics contributes to the ability of 
the rent seekers to campaign for ever greater use of antitrust.  One can find theoretical support 
for virtually any case in some aspect of modern I.O.112  Because this literature largely lacks the 
empirical support necessary for sound antitrust policy and because it rarely allows courts and 
agencies to develop workable rules to guide enforcement and business conduct, the impact on 
antitrust has so far been minimal.
There are still a few commentators who wish to expand enforcement in ways that would 
retard the progression in recent decades toward sensible substantive and institutional norms.113
112 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Improving the 
Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, Remarks at the George Mason University Law 
Review’s Winter Antitrust Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 15, 2003), available at, 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm>.
113 There is now even an organization dedicated to that end, the American Antitrust 
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Recommended areas of expansion include fuller use of per se rules,114 a return to 1970s’ style 
attacks on distributional restraints,115 greater reliance on structural presumptions against 
mergers,116 resurrection of the incipiency doctrine in merger cases,117 unprecedented expansion 
of alleged monopsony in merger cases,118 more emphasis on condemning price cutting,119 and 
even a return to the use of non-economic values in antitrust decision making.120
Of course, there also are those who argue against modern antitrust or any antitrust at 
Institute (AAI).  The group’s leaders, who have authored the material cited in the remainder of 
this paragraph, call for enforcement that would disregard the prudent limitations observed in 
recent decades. 
114 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute, In Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees Urging Affirmance of the Grant of Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs, 
Abbott Labs, Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Louisana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., Case No. 02-12091-J 
(11th Cir. 2002), available at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/193.pdf>.
115 See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, GTE Sylvania and the Future of Vertical Restraints 
Law, reprinted from ANTITRUST magazine (Fall 2002), available at
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/224a.pdf>.  
116 Warren S. Grimes & John E. Ewoka, A Study in Merger Enforcement 
Transparency: The FTC’s Ocean Cruise Decision and the Presumption Governing High 
Concentration Mergers, THEANTITRUSTSOURCE (May 2003), available at
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/may03/grimes.pdf>.
117 Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s Grocery to Consumer 
Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001).  
118 American Antitrust Institute, AAI Comment on the Wal-Mart Merger with Amigo 
Supermarkets in Puerto Rico (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/walmart/aai.pdf>; Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust 
Institute, The American Antitrust Institute: The First Five Years of a Virtual Public Interest 
Network (Oct. 13, 2003), available at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/275.pdf>.  
119 Foer, The American Antitrust Institute: The First Five Years, supra note 118, at 5.  
120
 Norman Hawker, Remarks on an Ethical Perspective of Antitrust Law, Before the 
Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys General, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 
1, 2003), available at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/227.pdf.>
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all.121  Such arguments have existed for decades, and enforcement officials have no trouble 
ignoring them.
3. Accounting Correctly for Non-Litigation Capabilities
A sound view of competition policy requires enforcement officials not only to identify 
their appropriate substantive priorities, but also to decide how to accomplish the agency’s 
substantive ends.122  The FTC has become more proficient over time in applying its collection of 
policy instruments in a systematic, coordinated way to accomplish its substantial aims.  
Examples include the FTC’s work in the pharmaceuticals sector, such as studies,123 advocacy,124
and litigation,125 and the Commission’s initiatives to address government restraints on 
competition, which include litigation,126 workshops,127 studies,128 and advocacy.129  The agency 
121 DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY 
FAILURE (2nd ed. 1990); Holman Jenkins, FTC Screams for Antitrust, W ALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 
2003, at A19.  
122 See Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the 
Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 C OLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 363.
123 See, e.g., See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent 
Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf>.
124 Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, In Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), available at< http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/01/busparbrief.pdf>.
125 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., FTC File Nos. 0010221 (Taxol), 0110046 
(BuSpar), 021081 (Cisplatin) (Apr. 18, 2003) (consent order), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersconsent.pdf>.   
126 See, e.g., South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, Dkt. No. 9311 (Sept. 12, 2003) 
(complaint), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf>.
127 See, e.g., Notice of Public Workshop and Opportunity to Comment, 67 Fed. Reg. 
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should always press itself to consider both its substantive goals and the tools available to achieve 
its ends.
One of former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky’s keenest insights was his rediscovery of 
hearings and workshops as policymaking instruments.  The FTC continues to use the intuition 
that moved Chairman Pitofsky to hold hearings and issue reports to realize the FTC’s 
institutional comparative advantage.  The agency is also expanding reliance on administrative 
litigation130 and devoting considerable attention to seeking synergies and policy lessons in the 
integration of its competition and consumer policies.131
A full assessment and application of institutional capabilities provides a more complete 
insight into the causes of competitive distortions.  Consider the case of supplier collusion and 
facilitating practices.  Originating with George Stigler’s research on coordination among 
48,472 (Jul. 24, 2002).  The workshop agenda, the participants’ written statements, and public 
submissions are available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.htm>.
128 See, e.g., FTC Staff Report, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce:  
Wine (July 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf>.; Alan E. 
Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, How Many Bottles Make a Case Against Prohibition?  Online Wine and 
Virginia’s Direct Shipment Ban, (Working Paper Mar. 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp258.pdf>.
129 See, e.g., Letter from the FTC and the Department of Justice, Comments on the 
American Bar Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), 
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm>;  Letter from Charles A. James 
and Timothy J. Muris to the Ethics Committee of the North Carolina Bar Re: North Carolina 
State Bar Opinions Restricting Involvement of Non-Attorneys in Real Estate Closings and 
Refinancing Transactions (Dec. 14, 2001), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/be/VO20006.htm>.
130 See, e.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Dkt. No. 9300 (Dec. 19, 2003) (interim 
final order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9300/040102interimconsentorder.pdf.>
131 See, e.g., FTC Staff Report, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: 
Contact Lenses (Mar. 2004), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/>.
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competitors,132 we understand that suppliers must take several steps to collude effectively: reach 
consensus on terms of their collaboration, detect cheating, punish cheaters, and cope with entry.  
One way for a competition agency to attack collusion is to chose policy approaches that make it 
harder for firms to perform each of these tasks.
A great deal of attention has been devoted to “facilitating practices.”  One approach that 
the agencies used to address this was litigation at the fringes of Section 1 doctrine.133  There is 
another way to conceptualize the problem.  One phenomenon that facilitates collusion is 
government regulation and legislation that curbs entry or the forms of competition.  Agency 
advocacy to remove artificial barriers to entry and competition are every bit as valuable to an 
anti-collusion program as bringing cases.
A proper understanding of what causes or contributes to trade restraints is necessary to 
decide how best to allocate resources.  The Reagan administration implemented a substantial 
“facilitating practices” agenda that continues today – in the form of challenging (sometimes by 
litigation, sometimes by advocacy) government restrictions that either impose cartel terms or 
make cartel coordination easier to achieve.  Focusing on the fuller dimensions of the collusion 
problem – not simply through the lens of litigation – provided a better understanding of what 
competition policy must do to combat collusion.
C. The Cumulative Nature of Enforcement
Enforcement success in any one period often draws heavily upon earlier contributions of 
the enforcement agencies.  For example, DOJ's achievements in criminal enforcement in the 
1990s were remarkable, recovering unprecedented sums for injury to the domestic market. The 
132 See George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72  J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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successful prosecution of the food additives and vitamins cartels captured the attention of the 
world's competition community and catalyzed a global trend of national and regional efforts to 
detect and punish supplier collusion. The high profile DOJ criminal matters of the 1990s have 
accelerated the development of comprehensive global efforts to oppose cartels.
Careful examination reveals that the impressive breakthroughs of the 1990s built upon 
contributions that began in the 1950s and grew through the subsequent decades.134   In the mid-
to late-1970s, the DOJ urged courts to apply the recently enhanced penalties and to imprison 
violators.  The Reagan administration pressed for increases in statutory sanctions and prison 
terms.  In 1984, Congress created a new mechanism for calculating criminal fines that permits 
the maximum Sherman Act fine to be set at twice the loss suffered by victims or twice the 
offender’s gain.135   This double- loss/double-gain mechanism supplied the basis for the huge 
recoveries in the 1990s.136  The enhancement in penalties continued, with changes to sentencing 
guidelines and increases in fines.137  The development of federal criminal antitrust enforcement 
reveals progressive, cumulative development of competition policy.  DOJ’s criminal 
133 E.I. du Pont de Demours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F. 2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).  
134 See Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 4, at 418 (describing successful 
prosecutions in electrical equipment cases in 1950s and 60s, and the change in Sherman Act 
criminal violation from misdemeanor to felony and increase in penalties in 1974).
135 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(d) (1994).  Congress first enacted this provision in the 
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984), and reenacted 
the measure in the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub.L.No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 
(1987).
136 See Donald I. Klawiter, After the Deluge: The Powerful Effect of Substantial 
Criminal Fines, Imprisonment, and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel 
Enforcement, 69 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 745 (2001) (discussing impact of double the loss, double 
the gain fine calculation formula).
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enforcement program has completed each decade in stronger condition than at the decade’s start.
The cumulative nature of competition policy requires that each enforcement official 
recognize the contributions of predecessors and understand how choices today affect 
performance in the long term.  It is a Washington aphorism that policy makers pick the low-
hanging fruit.  It is less common to hear exhortations about the need to plant trees.  Without a 
norm that accounts for long-term effects of current decisions, incumbent officials may be 
tempted to invest too heavily in activities that result in immediate opportunities for credit.  Those 
who have observed the evolution of the FTC over 30 years should appreciate the need to invest 
in the long-term.
D. Experimentation: Extensions of Policy and Self-Limiting Principles
Modern experience shows that competition agencies periodically experiment at the 
boundaries of doctrine – either seeking extensions or exercising restraint.  Donald Turner's 1968 
Guidelines began the rationalization of merger policy, which was becoming completely detached 
from any sound conception of economics.138   Though modest in retrospect, Turner's self-limiting 
guidelines were revolutionary when adopted.  They not only refused to push enforcement policy 
to the limits the courts had established, they also established the idea that antitrust officials 
should issue guidelines that reveal their enforcement intentions, even if this reduced their 
freedom of action.
When the Reagan administration began, antitrust law was already changing.  As a 
Washington Post editorial later observed, many of the old rules simply were “undermined by 
137 See, e.g., Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 4, at 419.
138 U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101.  
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observations of how the world works.”139  These changes influenced federal antitrust 
enforcement.  The FTC and the DOJ retreated from enforcement policies based on the simple 
market concentration doctrine.  Reagan officials argued that the earlier period’s preoccupation 
with concentration ratios and suspicion toward benign or procompetitive business conduct led to 
unduly restrictive merger policies and a record of misconceived monopolization suits.140  To 
chart a new course, the Reagan antitrust era undertook changes to address the previous errors.
As discussed above, the previous antitrust enforcement agenda sprung from two 
synergistic beliefs about markets.  First, a lack of confidence in the power and vitality of 
markets, and second, overconfidence in government’s ability to intervene in markets to fix their 
perceived weaknesses.  The Reagan antitrust agencies held very different beliefs, having great 
respect for the strength and adaptability of markets and a humble view of their ability to 
intervene in markets beneficially.  Rigid reliance on concentration statistics and structural 
presumptions would no longer suffice; enforcers would have to study the competitive dynamics 
of the market. There was growing awareness that the U.S. is part of a global economy and that 
efficiencies are important.  Thus, the Reagan officials sought to apply more sensible merger 
standards and to withdraw the government from most Section 2 enforcement.141
A few FTC activities during the 1970s evidence a re-evaluation of certain types of 
antitrust enforcement.  For example, as Table 1 reveals, the Commission decreased Robinson-
139 Editorial, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1983, at A-16.
140 See William E. Kovacic, Built to Last? The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan 
Administration, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 244, 245-46 (1988); William E. Kovacic, Public Choice 
and the Public Interest: Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement During the Reagan 
Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 467, 477-78 (1988).
141 See Kovacic, Legacy, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J, supra note 140, at 245-46.
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Patman Act enforcement.  Although there was no statutory change in the Robinson Patman Act 
to account for this reduction in enforcement, several phenomena likely caused this change, 
including judicial decisions indicating that courts were becoming increasingly skeptical about the 
statute.
Another illustration of change is the FTC’s assessment of the GM-Toyota joint venture  to 
build subcompact cars in California.  The Commission's extensive investigation of the venture 
was important, both for its impact on automobile producers and consumers and in guiding later 
thinking about efficiencies and joint ventures.   Because the venture, if upgraded beyond its 
planned scope, could have presented risks to competition, but also would in other respects 
significantly benefit consumers, the Commission negotiated a consent agreement permitting the 
venture with certain limitations.  As constrained by the consent, the venture 1) increased the total 
number of small cars for sale in the U.S., thus allowing consumers a greater choice at lower 
prices; 2) resulted in a car less costly to produce than if GM had to rely on some other production 
source; 3) offered a valuable opportunity for GM and U.S. industry generally to learn about 
Japanese manufacturing and management techniques; and 4) enabled Toyota to gain experience 
with auto manufacturing in the United States before it opened its own plant in Kentucky.  
The Commission's decision on the GM-Toyota joint venture seemed daring at the time 
and was vigorously opposed.  One Commissioner dissented bitterly:
In this decision, the Commission has swept another set of generally recognized antitrust 
principles into the dustbin, using again the incorporeal economic rhetoric that now dominates 
Commission decision-making. In this case, the decision results in the blessing of a business 
proposal that is both breathtaking in its audacity and mind-numbing in its implications for future 
joint ventures leading U.S. firms and major foreign competitors that seek to lend a helping 
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hand.142
These concerns seem quaint today.  Indeed, less than ten years later when the parties argued that 
there was no longer any reason for the consent order, the Commission agreed.143  The antitrust 
world barely noticed.
E. Articulating a Positive Agenda
Modern competition policy teaches an important lesson about what competition 
authorities must do to develop support for their programs.  They must work continuously to 
articulate a positive agenda and to state the assumptions that guide the formulation of the
agenda.144   Thus, it is useful for agency officials to discuss in detail what the FTC should do in 
each area of is mandate – competition policy,145 consumer protection,146 and the integration of 
economic analysis into public policy.147
142 General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 397 (1984) (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey). 
143 General Motors Corp., 116 F.T.C. 1276 (1993). 
144 See RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MIKLIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY 
CHANGE 187-89 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasizing that James C. Miller III’s contributions to regulatory 
reform as FTC Chairman consisted substantially of building and implementing a positive agenda 
rather than simply rolling back unsound policies that he inherited).
145 See, e.g., Muris, Looking Forward, supra note 122, at 359.
146 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris,, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy, Remarks at 
the Aspen Summit (Aug. 19, 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.htm>.
147 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Improving the 
Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, Remarks at the George Mason University Law 
Review’s Winter Antitrust Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 15, 2003), available at, 
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Past experience underscores the importance of these measures.  A key element of Jim 
Miller’s chairmanship of the FTC was to explain the affirmative steps the agency was committed 
to accomplish – for example, the prosecution of collusive behavior, especially in the professions, 
on the competition side, and the prosecution of serious fraud on the consumer protection side –
and not simply to indicate areas in which it would retreat.  Unfortunately, some officials in the 
FTC and in the DOJ lost sight of this principle in Ronald Reagan’s second term.
H. Anticipating and Accounting for Institutional Change 
The past four decades have featured extraordinary change in the institutions that influence 
competition policy.  One major phenomenon is the greater distribution of policymaking authority 
– at home and abroad.  New competition policy bodies now exist, and existing bodies have 
assumed expanded policymaking roles.  Another change is a growing awareness of how the 
interaction of seemingly distinct institutions affects competition policy.  As the FTC’s recent 
report on intellectual property reveals, one may not routinely think of rights granting 
organizations as formulating competition policy, but they greatly influence the competitive 
environment.148
Both dimensions – the greater distribution of authority and an understanding of the 
interaction of institutions – require reassessment of the choice of policy tools, the approaches to 
reconciling the operation of different agencies, and the selection of strategies for dealing with 
institutional multiplicity.  Two lessons from the history of modern competition policy and from 
the evolution of other fields of law stand out.
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm>.
148 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy 2 (Oct. 2003), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf>.
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The first lesson is to appreciate the need to develop approaches for ensuring that the best 
ideas emerge to guide policymaking.  Thus, investments in activities that promote the “bottom-
up” development of norms can yield superior, widely accepted standards.149  This explains the 
emphasis the agency has given to the International Competition Network and to encouraging 
fuller cooperation with domestic agencies that influence competition policy. 
The second lesson is the need to watch for opportunities to identify superior approaches 
and to formulate cooperative relationships to improve upon the results that any single 
competition body could achieve.  Thus, U.S. competition policy officials can benefit greatly 
from studying the accomplishments and experience of their colleagues in Europe.150  FTC 
officials also have underscored their interest in working with other U.S. institutions to formulate 
a positive cooperative program that improves the overall quality of U.S. competition policy.151
III. Improving the Institutional Foundations for Competition Policy
Modern competition policy experience contains lessons for how competition agencies 
should operate.  This section uses those lessons to identify several steps to improve the quality of 
competition policy.
149 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Competition 
Agencies in a Market-Based Global Economy, Remarks at the Annual Lecture of the European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Brussels, Belgium (July, 23 2002), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723brussels.htm>.
150 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, State Intervention / 
State Action – A U.S. Perspective, Remarks Before the Fordham Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law & Policy, New York, NY (Oct. 24, 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/fordham031024.pdf>.
151 See Susan A. Creighton, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade 
Commission, A Federal-State Partnership on Competition Policy: State Attorneys General as 
Advocates, Remarks Before the National Association of Attorneys General 2003 Antitrust 
Seminar, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1, 2003), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ 
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A. Continuing Self-Assessment
To sail on an accurate course, one cannot merely point the ship in what one believes to be 
the right direction.  Good navigation requires periodic readings to verify that the ship is still on 
course.  Relying on a single, isolated reading is insufficient; constant verification is required.  
Only repeated checking of progress and comparisons of an array of indicators will keep the ship 
from substantial deviations.  
For competition policy agencies, this insight requires continuing investments in analyzing 
the consequences of what they do, both with litigation and with non-litigation tools.   For 
example, to assess the efficacy of merger enforcement, agencies should analyze the effects of 
past enforcement actions, including non-enforcement decisions.  They need to understand better 
the industry and firm specific conditions relevant to the potential for anticompetitive effects. 
They also require more knowledge about the nature and likelihood of significant procompetitive 
effects of mergers. Understanding the efficiencies that can arise from mergers and how they are 
achieved would provide greater ability to evaluate prospective mergers.
Embracing a norm of self-assessment – for example, by studying the effects of past 
initiatives – serves multiple ends.  Perhaps most important, it helps avoid being trapped in an 
analytical model that developments in theory and doctrine have passed by.  Since the 1970s and 
the structure-conduct-performance debate, the number of industrial organization (I.O.) 
economists and their research have soared.  During the 1980s and into the 1990s, industrial 
organization attracted many of the best young economists. Although I.O. was once a largely 
empirical discipline, in recent decades empirical research has lost much of its market share. The 
lure of I.O. for most young economists was to apply modern mathematical economics (largely 
031001naag.htm>.
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game theory) to the relatively undeveloped turf of industrial organization.
Undoubtedly, there have been important advances in this mathematical literature that 
have been distilled into useful operational principles. For example, modern oligopoly theory built 
on the work of George Stigler to provide a useful approach to the analysis of tacit coordination.  
The enhancement by DOJ and other competition authorities of leniency programs employs the 
basic intuition of the prisoner's dilemma to induce individual cartel participants to reveal their 
unlawful collaboration.  Despite these accomplishments, there have been few successful efforts 
to translate the mathematically elaborate, game theoretic models into administrable antitrust rules 
or analytical techniques to support enforcement.
B. Competition Policy R&D
Performing ex post assessments of agency initiatives is one dimension of a larger 
category of activity that one can call competition policy R&D.152  Using workshops, hearings, 
studies, and reports, the agency increases its intellectual capital and informs the competition 
policy community about noteworthy developments.  Investments in competition policy R&D are 
assuming progressively greater importance.  In a world of greater economic complexity and 
institutional multiplicity, building intellectual capital is essential to understand new phenomena 
and to exercise intellectual leadership.  With broadly distributed policymaking authority, the 
FTC typically cannot impose its will on other competition agencies.  It must gain acceptance for 
its views by persuasion, not fiat.  Without strong intellectual capital, such persuasion is 
impossible.
C. Accounting for Long-Term Institutional Effects
152 See Muris, Future Development of Competition Policy, supra note 122, at 403-
404.
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Past experience compels one to inquire how today’s policy choices affect tomorrow’s 
competition policy.  Is the agency managing its resources to the greatest effect or is it 
overcommitted?  Before the agency undertakes new projects, it needs to determine whether it can 
see them through to completion.  Should the agency test prototypes of initiatives on a limited 
scale before undertaking full production? 
A vital focus of decision making should be how individual resource allocation choices 
contribute to the long-term success of the agency.  History shows how the decisions of any FTC 
chairman affect the agency’s performance for years after the incumbent chairman leaves office.  
Agency leaders must resist the temptation of eliciting the transient praise that comes from 
starting projects that look good on take-off but run a serious risk of crashing during a successor’s 
tenure.  The goal is to make choices that generate positive, not negative, externalities on the 
agency and future leadership.  
Conclusion
As the interval between the events described in this paper and the current time increases, 
it is likely that a growing part of antitrust community, here and abroad, lacks first-hand 
knowledge of much of this history.  An attorney who began a career in 1980 would have little 
direct experience with enforcement in the 1960s or 1970s.  If that attorney started in 1990, he or 
she would have heard of Bill Baxter or Jim Miller but would not have observed the adjustments 
they or other Reagan appointees brought to federal enforcement.  If the attorney began work in 
the past few years, a common condition in the many jurisdictions that only recently have adopted 
competition laws, most of this history comes second hand.  Indeed, sometime in the near future, 
a generation of leadership will come to the world’s antitrust agencies without first-hand 
familiarity with the developments that shaped competition policy in the last decades of the 20th
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century.
In the past few years, the FTC has devoted considerable attention to the historical 
evolution of competition policy.  In 2001, the agency convened a program to recognize the 25th
anniversary of the enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.  In 
the same year, the Commission inaugurated the Miles W. Kirkpatrick Award for outstanding 
service to the Commission.  The first three recipients were Basil Mezines, Robert Pitofsky, and 
Jodie Bernstein.  In 2003, the Commission held a day-long symposium on economic analysis to 
commemorate the 100th anniversary of the creation of the FTC’s predecessor body, the Bureau of 
Corporations.153
These and similar activities serve multiple purposes.  One basic and important aim is to 
honor the many individuals who have built the Federal Trade Commission.  This paper has 
described good policy as partly the result of a cumulative development over time.  Great public 
institutions remember and respect those who made the farsighted investments to make the 
progression possible.   Recounting this history is forward-looking, as well.  With the gradual 
thinning of the ranks of individuals who witnessed antitrust’s modern development firsthand, 
there is an urgency to see that the competition policy community and new agency leaders 
understand past experience.  Strong policymaking builds upon accurate knowledge of past 
enforcement trends and a sound interpretation of intellectual and institutional forces that account 
for changes in emphasis and activity over time.  So it is that history should, and does, inform 
practice. 
153 See FTC Announces Roundtable Celebrating 100th Anniversary of its 
Predecessor Agency - the Bureau of Corporations (July 2003), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/beroundtable.htm.>
